Introduction

Migration in Europe has found itself at a crossroads between human rights, globalisation, and state sovereignty. The world underwent a significant shift between the 1960s and 2000, prefaced by globalisation. This phenomenon deterred the state control countries once had, and pushed for global economic interdependence. As states became more “developed”, due to technological advancements, education, and access to information, continents such as Europe became magnets for migration. This change shifted the traditional narratives of North-South migration flows to more complex, multi-directional movements. This effect was recorded by political scientist Mathias Czaika, who demonstrated how states progressively lacked control over migration (Czaika, 2014). However, following the 9/11 attacks in New York, terrorism in Madrid in March 2004, and the London 2005 bombings, migration became a topic of defence (Aslan, 2022). As a result, governments framed this turning point as a “threat,” justifying their restrictive policies, surveillance measures, and externalisation agreements.

Moreover, not all migrants are viewed the same according to states; they distinguish between “ex-pats” and “migrants”. This phenomenon, and the negative impacts it has on fostering threat perceptions in  populations, is well documented (De Coninck, 2020). Consequently, after these terror attacks, the EU pushed for the outsourcing of migration control to Libya, Niger, and Morocco, as well as the outsourcing of border control to companies like Frontex, which use military force to secure borders. Despite these measures, migration persists, exposing the limitations of EU and State policies. Ongoing migration flows and incessant policy adjustments in European circles prove this outcome. This study is key to understanding the gaps between the EU’s development goals and practical outcomes on the ground, particularly in ensuring alignment with human rights standards. Additionally, it is of the utmost importance to fill these gaps given the findings of the UNHCR (2023) report, which recorded over 160,000 migrants arriving by sea to Europe in 2022 alone. This research unveils the institutional and historical gaps in a European Framework. Furthermore, by evaluating securitisation, bureaucratic paralysis, and rhetorical divergences across the political spectrum, it reveals how institutional narratives impede governance and negatively impact migrant well-being.

Finally, in this report, we seek to understand how current governance frameworks face structural challenges in meeting both migrant needs and the EU’s foundational commitments to human rights. We will also expand on the usage of migration as a political tool and its impact on the livelihood of migrants. Moreover, given these tensions between state sovereignty and human rights, we intend to analyse EU migration governance through the competing lenses of Waltzian realism, Fareed Zakaria’s neoclassical realism, and Robert Keohane’s institutionalism. The first frame claims that states, or individual member states in the European context, influence decisions. Conversely, Zakaria’s and Keohane’s theoretical frames focus on globalisation and supranational influence, and suggest that EU laws supersede Member State laws.

Theoretical Perspectives on State Control in Migration

Waltzian’s Theory of Realism & Migration

Kenneth Waltz’s theory of realism views migration as a sovereignty issue and adopts a state-centred approach to this phenomenon. Moreover, national security concerns justify procedures like the restriction and control of borders, enforcement, and pushbacks. These actions are “justified” because migrants are perceived as a “threat” to societies (Aslan, 2022). This phenomenon has been widely documented in psychology to analyse discourse in states and their populations, and to analyse legal discourse that can spread discriminatory narratives (Ekerim-Akbulut et al., 2020). This research found that how the law frames migration and how citizens frame it impact the reception and perception of migrants in states. Lastly, understanding neoclassical realism by Fareed Zakaria is crucial to understanding overly militarised migration policies. He argues that domestic political pressures like electoral concerns, populist sentiments, or elite competition can significantly shape how states respond to migration. Due to these threat perceptions, leaders adopt militarised migration policies not only because of geopolitical threats but because of internal dynamics, like fear of losing votes to far-right competitors or maintaining public approval. This explains why even pro-European governments and parties might adopt harsh migration stances during election cycles.

When analysing Italy and Greece, facts and statistics show that overly restrictive border security practices are ineffective. For example, Italy’s closed ports policy under Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini demonstrates the realistic assumption that nation-state sovereignty overrides international legal obligations. Despite this approach, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) recorded an increase in the number of migrant arrivals between January 2017 and 2018. Land and sea arrivals  amounted to 2,453 and 2,182 respectively. Furthermore, think tanks such as Reuters have thoroughly documented the link between this policy and the rise of migrant deaths at sea. Moreover, Greece implemented similar realist securitisation strategies by tightening border controls and expanding restrictive enforcement methods. The aftermath of this approach is the same as in Italy, with an increase of 2,275 migrants who died or went missing while attempting to cross the sea. This amounts to an average of six lives lost per day, according to UNHCR. These human rights violations are well documented, but the Greek Ministry of Migration continues to apply force and restrictive measures because it reduced migration by 33%. Despite repeated calls from the European Court of Human Rights and other international bodies to put a stop to these policies, Greece continues these practices. These findings highlight that realist and highly securitised narratives do not mitigate migration flows and nor do they respect international human rights. Alternative frameworks are needed to effectively regulate migration while also upholding human rights obligations.

Neo-Institutionalism & Migration Governance

In this next section, we delve into Neo-Institutionalism and Migration Governance. This theory differentiates itself from realist theories because it claims that states prioritise sovereignty over international constraints. Neo-Institutionalism argues that states operate within constraints set by supranational institutions. States adopt this perspective because the EU, UNHCR, and human rights laws influence behaviours and establish legal obligations that coordinate mechanisms, which realism downplays. For example, international treaties such as the Geneva Convention, or EU law in this convention, create legal frameworks which guide Member States on how to manage migration. Moreover, another fact supporting this theory is that economic interdependence in the European Union means that states cannot simply “shut borders” without disrupting labour markets and political alliances. Therefore, multilateral governance fails to balance nation-state and supranational needs, which leads to less cooperation. This fact stresses the need for further incentives to promote better supranational governance. A great comparative example here is the Dublin III Regulation and the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum. The original pact disproportionately impacted southern states, while the New Pact attempts to balance responsibility with solidarity through relocation and financial support mechanisms. However, state compliance is fragmented.

Moreover, human rights laws stipulate that states cannot freely deport or reject asylum seekers due to international refugee protections established in 1951 (Refugee Convention, ECHR). An example of a violation of this decree is the pushback from the European Court of Human Rights received by Greece when it violated EU asylum laws. Furthermore, supranational governance through EU directives and treaties aimed to enhance cooperation in asylum processing and reduce national discretion (Dublin III Regulation). However, this procedure failed after multiple attempts. Nowadays, the new migration pact aims to prioritise burden sharing, yet this framework has proven challenging to implement over the last decade due to lack of solidarity (Stepka, 2023). An example of when supranational authority overruled  national resistance is the 2020 ruling by the European Court of Justice against Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic for refusing to comply with the EU’s relocation scheme. Although compliance was limited, the case demonstrated the EU’s ability to hold states legally accountable and signalled the legitimacy of supranational enforcement in the migration domain.

It is important to emphasise the need for regulation in this domain, in order to restrict human rights violations that contradict European Union values. However, it is also crucial to do so given the economic opportunity that migrants represent not only to each nation-state but to the greater European Union (Czaika & de Haas, 2014). Multiple studies showcase the importance of migrants from an economic perspective in the fields of manufacturing in Germany and agriculture in Spain. Germany fosters integration through labour market inclusion and economic incentives, which demonstrates how migration can address workforce shortages. In contrast, Spain’s decision to implement stricter border controls limits integration, contradicting the institutionalist assumption that economic rationality leads to policy harmonisation. These approaches demonstrate how the securitisation model violates human rights and increases mortality rates, as evidenced by the IOM and UNHCR. The results of Spain’s approach should be seen as a lost economic opportunity since it fails to create integration pathways that address the country’s needs.

In summary, Neo-institutionalists claim that while constraints are real, they are selectively adhered to based on national interests. Though it is easy to “blame” Southern Member States for their highly securitised borders, we must also remember that the Dublin III Regulation, which aimed to create a structured asylum process, ultimately failed and led to policy fragmentation rather than cohesion. This selective adherence demonstrates the gap between theoretical commitments and political realities in this field. For example, scholars illustrate this by highlighting the use of migration in political narratives (Dermikol, 2022). Blaming Southern Member States or the EU for failing to exercise its power is neither a solution nor a constructive next step; therefore, addressing the disconnect between supranational frameworks and national compliance requires examining institutional enforcement mechanisms, political incentives, and party-driven migration narratives to understand the key dynamics at play.

Globalisation: Impacts on Migration

Globalisation began after the end of World War II and expanded in the early 1960s, fuelled by economic liberalisation and international trade agreements (Czaika & de Haas, 2014). The Bretton Woods Agreement (1944) created a new global monetary system forged by 44 nations, establishing institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. These different components contributed to this phenomenon, driving the world to mass industrialisation and development and generating interdependence. However, colonial legacies created dependencies between the South and North, for instance, France and the United Kingdom with their ex-colonies. The reason for the increase in migration from these places is linked to history and the implicit intervention and influence that these nations continue to have on these countries (Finotelli & Ponzo, 2023). This created a division between these two economies and their populations, creating disparities in labour markets emerging from globalisation (de Haas, 2021). It also generated migration corridors from Latin America to the U.S., and from Africa to Europe and other high-income destinations in the Global North (Czaika & de Haas, 2014). Moreover, international agreements such as the EU Blue Card or U.S. H-1B visa institutionalised the selective migration of skilled migrants over irregular ones. This new wave of migration, aided by mass digitalisation via WhatsApp, Tiktok and Telegram, pushed it further by increasing awareness and the creation of diaspora networks (Triandafyllidou, 2021; Stepka, 2023). While these technologies promote migration, they are used for border control through biometric screening and predictive AI for border surveillance (Aslan, 2022). Additionally, capitalism is another driver, impacting climate change through deforestation and industrial expansion (Betts, 2013; UNHCR, 2023).

Furthermore, globalisation has amplified the role of remittances as both a stabilising force and a soft power tool. In 2022 alone, remittances to low- and middle-income countries exceeded $600 billion (World Bank, 2023), influencing domestic economies and shaping migration diplomacy. Lastly, diaspora communities have also become influential political actors, lobbying for migration reform and bilateral agreements, particularly in the EU-African Union context. However, migration in the policy realm has become politically instrumentalised to justify stricter policies that regularly violate human rights. Politicians in the Global North also rarely acknowledge the fact that migration is the result of past and present colonial malpractices (Aslan, 2022). This paradox, where states rely on both legal and irregular migrants, demonstrates how states benefit from migration by instrumentalising it (Finotelli & Ponzo, 2023). Therefore, globalisation reshaped the causes and flows of migration, and political actors have increasingly reframed migration not as a structural challenge but as a tactical opportunity. By studying the instrumentalisation of migration by both ends of the political spectrum in following section, we will investigate this issue in the Europe context.

Migrant Instrumentalisation: States & Political Party Interest

In this section, I will explore how both right-wing actors and left-wing actors actively instrumentalise migration to further their political agendas. The tendencies we aim to explore are how right-wing parties often frame this issue as a security threat and economic burden, while the left tends to lean on the humanitarian side while overcomplicating bureaucratic frameworks (Triandafyllidou, 2021). These tendencies are apparent throughout Europe, shaping both national and supranational migration patterns and governance. Lastly, framing migration as a political threat allows parties to externalise blame and to distract from domestic governance failures. This scapegoating shifts public attention from economic or institutional shortcomings to “outsider” groups.

The Issue in Right-Wing Narratives

In this section, we will explore how Right-Wing Populist Parties (RRPs) frame migration as a crisis. Firstly, these parties use the rhetoric of “border invasion” to incite fear and justify securitisation, militarisation, and detention centres. Then, they describe migrants as an economic threat to create the sentiment of us vs them, leveraging the psychology of the in-group vs the out-group (Ekerim-Akbulut et al., 2020). Lastly, they use the concept of cultural fear to claim that migrants represent a “threat” to their cultural identity. This takes place through the theory of Social Identity by psychologists Henri Tajfel and John Turner, where they discovered that in-groups and out-groups emerge over trivial or harmless matters, like who enjoys or dislikes a painting. This shows how easy it is to divide groups and label people as “others”. Many studies have found that a combination of these tactics create hateful sentiments that permeate legal and social discourses (De Coninck, 2020; Reijerse et al., 2015). For example, in America, they found that discriminatory discourses taking place in social settings often permeated the legal system (Mingo, 2020). The reverse was also found to be true: discriminatory discourse in the legal system often trespassed into social contexts (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2012). Moreover, these dynamics are not only symbolic but material; they influence policy agendas, legal definitions, and the allocation of public resources across member states.

There are multiple examples of these practices at play. For instance, Matteo Salvini’s rhetoric on closed ports in Italy had a devastating impact, as mentioned above. According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the number of migrant deaths in the Mediterranean doubled in 2018 compared to 2017, coinciding with Salvini’s closed port policy. Moreover, Marine Le Pen’s debates on TF1 or Le Figaro showcase the use of this discourse to link migrants to economic strains. Expanding on this theory, Le Pen supports “national preference” in employment to lessen economic impacts generated by this phenomenon. Moreover, in 2022, Le Pen proposed reserving social housing and employment subsidies for French nationals, a policy condemned by human rights organisations as discriminatory. Another example is the Vox party in Spain. It frames migration as an attack on sovereignty and Spanish culture. A 2023 Eurobarometer survey showed that 61% of Vox voters believed that immigration was a major threat to Spanish identity, compared to 34% of the general population.

However, right-wing parties benefit from these narratives while on the campaign trail or in power. Keeping migration irregular fuels the “crisis” narrative, which maintains their voter base. Moreover, undocumented migrants sustain sectors like agriculture, construction, and domestic work (Finotelli & Ponzo, 2023). For example, Spain’s agricultural sector employs over 200,000 seasonal workers annually, many of whom lack legal status, yet are essential for harvest operations (OECD, 2023). This paradox highlights the disconnect between political rhetoric and economic reliance on migrant labour. Furthermore, this rhetoric fosters a reliance on irregular labour, which allows states to bypass formal labour protections and to suppress wages by withholding social service provisions.

The Issue in Left-Wing Narratives

In contrast, left-wing parties politicise migration as a human rights issue and frame it as a moral obligation to accept refugees. This sets them apart from right-wing policies and generates a base of constituents believing that they represent humanitarian values. However, this framing often lacks structural reform proposals, reducing human rights discourse to symbolic gestures rather than durable legal pathways.

For example, in France, President Macron juggles a humanitarian discourse with increasingly restrictive border enforcement. This illustrates the left’s rhetorical support for migrants while contributing to policy contradictions. Moreover, in 2024 President Macron’s government introduced a controversial immigration bill that requires migrants to pass tests on the French language and “republican values” in order to obtain residency. A report from Le Monde indicated that these measures could lead to nearly 60,000 migrants being denied legal status. Another example are parties like the Spanish PSOE (Socialist Party), who also support migration but increase deportation rates and overcomplicate  bureaucratic processes. These bureaucratic impasses prevent migrants from becoming legal residents.

As a result, labour migrants and international students often fall into irregular statuses due to administrative delays and rigid visa regimes. For instance, a 2023 report by El País showed that nearly 40% of student visa holders in Spain faced delays exceeding 90 days in the renewal process, contributing to irregular status. This duality in left-wing discourse is reflected in academic literature as well, where civic or humanitarian framings of migration are often used to gain legitimacy, even while restrictive measures persist in practice (Reijerse et al., 2015). This contradiction reveals how moral rhetoric is undermined by restrictive administrative frameworks and deportation practices. Therefore, left-wing parties benefit from political dialogue but do not aim to manage or amend the issue, which results in numerous migrants arriving legally and losing their status because of these policies. According to the Spanish Ministry of Interior (2023), Spain carried out 3,677 repatriations, of which 84% were deportations, many involving individuals who had initially entered the country legally but fell into irregularity due to administrative or labour constraints.

In summary, migration policy is often shaped by competing political incentives, which may inadvertently lead to inconsistent or fragmented governance approaches that, at times, benefit these parties. Therefore, left-wing parties risk eroding public trust in their governance when their discourse fails to match administrative realities, further fuelling voter disillusionment and support for much harsher alternatives.

Conclusion

In conclusion, migration worldwide, particularly in the European Union, has become a politically exploited topic. Solely relying on either a nationalistic or supranational legislative approach is not sustainable; we need multiple branches of governance to work cohesively. Although we cannot undo the legacies of globalisation and capitalism, we need to critically examine and address the contemporary shortcomings of these policy frameworks. Moreover, these political positions often lack consistency and transparency, demanding deeper scrutiny from engaged citizens and researchers alike. The Right asserts that security-driven approaches are best for the economy; however, they do so by profiting from irregular migration, often at the expense of human rights. The Left, meanwhile, claims to prioritise human rights and asylum protections, but often implements overly complex bureaucratic systems that undermine regularisation pathways and contribute to status precarity. This research intends to unveil the structural, institutional, and psychological mechanisms that institutions and political parties use in this domain. Specifically, social identity dynamics hinder a just formation of migration policies. Therefore, only through a critical analysis of systems we have collectively built can we create migration policies that transcend electoral cycles and align with the foundational human rights values that we, as Europeans, have promised to uphold.

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