Since its 12 original member states signed the treaty in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has served Western security interests, aiming to prevent future wars in Europe by promising a collective military response to attacks on NATO member nations. NATO’s core tenet is Article 5, which stipulates that “an armed attack on one or more [member state] shall be considered an attack against all.” The promise of a joint response has been effective in preventing another war on the scale of the World Wars. However, the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine has exposed several vulnerabilities and flaws in NATO’s collective defense strategy of deterrence, calling the organization’s future in European security into question. 

Russia has made several attempts to test NATO’s response coordination and air, naval, and cyber defenses. In one incident, 21 Russian Drones flew into Polish airspace. In reaction, NATO states scrambled fighter jets and used ground-based air defense systems to shoot the drones down. Poland invoked NATO’s Article 4, which requires member states to convene if another member state believes the “territorial integrity, political independence, or security” of a member state is threatened. The result of the subsequent consultation of the North Atlantic Council was the initiation of NATO’s Operation Eastern Sentry. The mission is designed to enhance NATO’s airspace defense capabilities, especially along NATO’s borders with Russia. It entails air patrols by the United Kingdom and contributions of defense assets, such as jets and anti-aircraft warships, from other NATO members, including France, Denmark, Germany, and the Czech Republic. The General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces stated that Eastern Sentry “is a clear signal: NATO’s borders are inviolable, and the security of our citizens remains a priority.” This response does strengthen NATO’s defense capabilities, but other structural vulnerabilities threaten NATO’s ability to ensure security in the North Atlantic through collective defense.

It is also essential to note that officials widely believe that one of the reasons Russia invaded Ukraine was to prevent NATO’s expansion along the Russian border. Throughout numerous failed attempts at mediation, Russia has demanded the demilitarization of Ukraine, as well as promises that Ukraine will never be permitted to join the organization and that NATO will permanently cease expansion. In the most recent attempt at a peace agreement, proposed by the United States, Ukraine and NATO would both be required to enshrine these demands in their founding documents. These conditions are a clear demonstration of Russia’s influence on NATO’s structure and defensive capabilities. A counterproposal offered by several European member states altered the points regarding NATO expansion and Ukrainian NATO membership, leaving the options of further NATO expansion and possibly Ukrainian membership on the table for the future.

In addition to external factors, internal tensions amongst NATO states have also caused uncertainty in NATO’s role in European security following the conflict in Ukraine. U.S. President Trump has repeatedly stated that the U.S. has borne a greater share of the burden of supporting NATO than other member states. In 2002, signatory states agreed to devote at least 2% of their annual GDP to military and defense spending. This year, at the NATO Summit in The Hague, member states collectively agreed to raise this percentage to 5% by 2035. Furthermore, the U.S. undercut its NATO allies in its recent peace proposal, which would not permit NATO to station troops in Ukraine after the war. The U.S. offered this proposal without consulting allies such as France and the U.K., which were both planning to station forces in Ukraine as peacekeepers following the war’s end. The U.S. also spoke out of turn on behalf of the entirety of NATO when it agreed that NATO would never expand further. This disunity amongst NATO allies could convey weakness to Russia. Obvious holes in lines of communication between allies and disagreements over objectives in a peace agreement, as well as NATO’s future structure, give Russia insight into how coordinated a NATO response might be in a direct conflict with a member state. 

These vulnerabilities in NATO’s collective defense strategy cast doubt on NATO’s security role in Europe in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war, and NATO has not taken sufficient measures to address them. While efforts so far, such as Operation Eastern Sentry, are a good step in securing NATO airspace, they do not adequately respond to the repeated Russian incursions. In part, this is due to NATO’s failure to evolve technologically. The rise of drone warfare, particularly one-way attack drones, has changed the calculus of war. Using the most expensive, highest-level tech possible, such as fighter jets and anti-air missiles, to combat incoming air threats is no longer an effective approach. The swarm of small Russian drones that flew into Polish airspace was relatively inexpensive, costing only around $10,000 per unit to produce. When NATO jets on patrol sorties that cost tens of thousands of dollars per hour, per jet, use missiles that cost hundreds of thousands of dollars each to shoot down these inexpensive drones, NATO is on the losing side of the exchange from a financial standpoint. The use of drones has significantly evolved and has become the predominant method by which Russia wages its air war on Ukraine. Thus, NATO’s current air-defense strategy is not sustainable in the long term, especially given the current discourse among key NATO states about the budgetary burden. 

Despite raising the target for defense spending as a percentage of GDP to 5%, NATO’s burden-sharing is still uncoordinated. Most NATO states are well aware that this goal is likely unachievable, as nine member states don’t even meet the current standard of 2%. Even if, by 2035, all NATO members invest 5% of their annual GDP in defense, it will not immediately rectify the uneven distribution of the financial burden. Moreover, although several European NATO states proposed an alternative peace deal to the U.S.’ unilateral Russia-Ukraine proposal, it is still clear to the world that there are significant differences in the interests of the U.S. and European NATO states. The differing interests of NATO and its most significant contributor, the U.S., present a highly divided front to the world, regardless of the financial agreements and new proposals NATO makes.

To properly address its vulnerabilities, NATO must first address these internal debates. NATO should put draft a peace proposal for the Russia-Ukraine conflict together to encompass the interests of all NATO states. A unified peace proposal holds more weight than several separate proposals coming from different actors, and would strengthen NATO’s ability to monitor compliance.

Additionally, NATO should reconsider its 5% target for defense spending, focusing first on getting all member states to 2%. A 3% target in the next 3 years would then be a more attainable goal, and should focus on the areas where it is needed most. Tangible progress in strengthening NATO would present a more unified and coordinated front to Russia and the rest of the world. 

Next, NATO must address its defensive vulnerability by modernizing its air defense strategy and integrating this strategy across all NATO countries with Russian borders. NATO should pursue the development of an electronic warfare system that can counter inexpensive waves of one-way attack drones in a similarly cost-effective manner. A massive array of drone jammers can be used repeatedly without incurring additional costs, unlike guided anti-aircraft missiles and other air defense systems. The production cost would be a one-time cost, and the upkeep costs would likely be less than the current cost of shooting dozens of individuals threats down with expensive munitions. This hypothetical modernized air-defense system would require even more coordination than Operation Eastern Sentry. Although technological and military collaboration on such a large scale may present challenges, it would would be a historical feat symbolizing NATO’s future commitment to providing security to Europe. 

Regardless of the methods it decides to employ, NATO must focus on demonstrating to its adversaries and allies that the organization is unified and that open communication regarding NATO’s collective interests occurs between member states. Presenting a strong, unified front will allow NATO to reinforce the very collective defense promise on which it was founded and ensure that its adversaries cannot exploit its vulnerabilities. Without first resolving internal divisions, NATO’s ability to protect its interests and allies will continue to erode, and its future role in European security will become even more uncertain. NATO is at a crossroads- its inaction could lead to its loss of power, but proactive change could usher in a new age of global cooperation and security. NATO’s ability to modernize and cooperate will decide whether Article 5 remains a credible deterrent or an obsolete ideal.