Twelve Hong Kong pro-democracy activists had their appeals dismissed by the Hong Kong Court of Appeal on February 23. The activists, who sought to overturn their sentences or convictions under the 2020 National Security Law (NSL), had been sentenced to varying prison terms ranging from four to ten years. The court also upheld the acquittal of activist Lawrence Lau in a related decision.
The appellants were among the 47 activists prosecuted for subversion following their attempts to hold an unofficial primary election, which the government claimed was designed to elect a pro-democracy majority to the city’s legislative council. That majority could then use its veto over the government budget to force the Chief Executive to resign. According to the court, this constituted a violation of NSL Article 22, which prohibits “seriously interfering in, disrupting, or undermining the performance of duties and functions … [of] the body of power of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.” In rejecting the appeals, Chief Judge of the High Court Jeremy Poon Shiu-chor argued that the appellants’ behavior constituted a crime under Article 22 due to its intent as a “constitutional mass destruction weapon for the purpose of toppling the constitutional order in the HKSAR.”
Although a Hong Kong government spokesman commented that the dismissal “clearly demonstrated that anyone who attempts to subvert state power or endanger national security will ultimately face punishment in accordance with the law,” a view echoed by Beijing and legal experts in mainland China, international reactions were critical of the decision’s broad application of the NSL to suppress dissent. Amnesty International Hong Kong Overseas spokesperson Fernando Cheung argued, echoing the appellants’ legal position, that “none of these 12 defendants committed an internationally recognized crime.” Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong separately criticized “the continuing broad application of national security legislation,” citing Australian citizen Gordon Ng’s failed appeal.
The NSL has been the most prominent and far-reaching of Beijing’s attempts to tighten its control over Hong Kong since the handover from Britain in 1997. Mass protests erupted in the territory in 2019, sparked by anger over a proposed bill that would have allowed extradition to mainland China, and gave rise to a popular movement supporting both democracy and independence from Beijing. In response, the Beijing-controlled Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress crafted legislation to ensure “national security,” and the NSL was passed in 2020 without any input from Hong Kong.
In practice, the law has created a parallel administrative apparatus capable of circumventing the territory’s common law system. Several of its provisions supersede or abrogate the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s general legal framework, effectively eliminating meaningful due process in national security cases. The NSL empowers the Secretary for Justice to waive trial by jury in such cases, a power invoked in every case brought before the High Court to date, and also establishes a presumption against bail and restricts defendants’ rights to choose their own legal counsel.
The effects of Beijing’s systematic suppression have been profound. Mirroring the mainland Chinese legal system, where courts are controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the conviction rate under the NSL has been nearly 100%. The chilling effect on civil society has been severe: according to legal scholar Johannes Chan, more than 60 civil society organizations, “including political parties, trade unions, humanitarian funds, professional groups, students unions, and human rights groups, have disbanded or moved out of Hong Kong.” On February 9, media tycoon and prominent CCP critic Jimmy Lai was sentenced to 20 years in prison under the NSL.
Ultimately, NSL convictions reflect Beijing’s determination to assert control over Hong Kong regardless of human rights, achieved through the gradual subversion of its preexisting rule of law. As long as the CCP maintains its grip on power, which seems likely given both its gatekeeping role over the world’s second-largest economy and Xi Jinping’s decade-long consolidation of authority, Hong Kong’s political climate will increasingly come to resemble that of mainland China, to the profound detriment of its citizens.
