On the 9th and 10th of February, the African Union (AU) met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for their 33rd annual summit. This summit’s theme was “Silencing of the Guns”, acknowledging the range of devastating civil wars still terrorizing millions of civilians across the continent. The summit saw leaders of the 55-block union pledge to do more to help resolve conflicts alongside creating better conditions for economic development.
The summit re-invigorated the agenda introduced in 2013, titled “Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want”, which promised, among other targets, to silence all guns by 2020 through dialogue-centred conflict resolution. Unfortunately, the union has not achieved this ambitious target, although it did take some positive steps towards this goal in 2019. For example, Sudan was expelled from the AU after its military leaders attempted to quash pro-democracy protesters, leading to an agreement establishing joint military and civilian rule.
Other successes mentioned included an AU-sponsored agreement in the Central African Republic (February 2019), thawing tensions between the government and fourteen rival rebel groups. However, this victory was not conclusive. In May 2019, the UN reported that the rebel group 3R had massacred 46 people in a village north-west of the country. This incident underscores the uphill struggle that the AU faces in its efforts to restore peace while many of its members struggle to establish stable, democratic, and peaceful governance themselves.
Weaknesses of the bloc also include its institutional structure and functions. It has long faced difficulties of cooperation and trust between members, greatly hindering its ability to decide on cohesive policies and become a key player in international decisions about the resolution of its conflicts. Furthermore, the AU is set to unite the (similarly orientated) Political Affairs and Peace and Security departments. While this may help streamline strategy, current plans suggest the merge will axe 40 per cent of the departments’ jobs. This is likely to worsen its pre-existing reputation as having an “implementation deficit”, noted by one AU official. However, its influence is undercut by larger international organizations such as the UN Security Council, who insists on remaining the principal body overseeing the management of international peace and security. The International Crisis Group released a report prior to the summit, suggesting eight recommendations. The first is to seek cooperation with the UN over funding for peacekeeping operations, as the AU’s strengths include its dynamism – it can deploy troops mush faster for stabilization or counter-terrorism operations.
This year, South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa will take the helm as the AU chairperson, succeeding Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Ramaphosa was quick to identify Libya as one of the conflicts he wanted to focus on, a country plagued by war and chaos since a NATO-backed uprising overthrew the dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. International attention fell on Libya at a meeting in Berlin in January; where world powers agreed to end foreign interference, establish an arms embargo, and sustain a ceasefire. Tellingly, no Libyan representatives were invited, intensifying African frustrations over their non-inclusion. Sadly, reports on the 13th of February suggest the ceasefire has failed just a day after the UN security council passed an international mandate to support it.
In light of these recent events, the AU must continue to encourage more cooperation between neighbours, while taking firmer stances against authoritarian and warring governments in the region. This will not be easy: Freedom House continues to report a backsliding of the (weak) democratization that occurred in the 90s and early 2000s, meaning that in sub-Saharan Africa, only 12 per cent of residents are ‘free’. The pressure and spotlight turn to Ramaphosa, a capable and charismatic mediator, whom many hope can narrow the gap between the AU’s promises and outcomes.
