On April 7, Taiwanese opposition leader Cheng Li-Wun, chairwoman of the Kuomintang (KMT) party, visited Nanjing and Beijing, making her the first KMT leader to visit China in a decade. In Nanjing, Cheng laid a wreath at the mausoleum of Sun Yat-sen, the revolutionary who founded the KMT and the Republic of China. In remarks broadcast live to Taiwanese television, Cheng commented on equality, inclusiveness, and unity being the core tenets of Sun’s “all under heaven are equal” ideal, stating, “We should work together to promote reconciliation and unity across the [Taiwan] Strait and create regional prosperity and peace.” 

Cheng’s visit is the latest evidence that the KMT opts for engagement over confrontation when it comes to China, and it drew criticism from the governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for supposedly undermining national security and weakening deterrence. As tensions continue to swirl between both the KMT and DPP on one hand, and Taiwan and China on the other, many wonder whether a peaceful solution is possible through either dialogue or deterrence. In order to answer such a question, it is imperative to examine the histories of the KMT, DPP, and Chinese Communist Party (CPP) to determine how present-day positions shape the range of possible futures for Taiwan Strait relations. 

The origins of the Taiwan-China divide lie in the Chinese Civil War between the KMT and the CCP. After the CCP established the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the KMT, then led by Chiang Kai-shek, retreated to Taiwan and continued to claim legitimacy as the government of all of China under the Republic of China (ROC). For decades, the KMT ruled Taiwan as an authoritarian regime under martial law, suppressing political opposition while promoting a unified Chinese national identity in an era known as the “White Terror.” Meanwhile, the CCP consolidated control over mainland China and established its own political system. The separation of the two sides was initially seen by both as temporary, but over time hardened into a durable political divide. Taiwan’s rapid economic development and later democratization further transformed its internal identity, making it increasingly distinct from the mainland.

Although Taiwan was run by the KMT as a one-party system, an “outside the party” movement (“tangwai”) started to grow in the 1980s, from which the Democratic Progressive Party emerged. Formally established in 1986, the DPP pushed for democratization, human rights, and greater recognition of a Taiwanese identity. 

Soon thereafter, Taiwan transitioned to full democracy, lifting martial law in 1987 and holding its first direct presidential election in 1996. This democratization fundamentally changed cross-strait dynamics by intertwining electoral competition with Taiwan’s China policy. Since then, Taiwan’s political system has been defined largely by the competition between the KMT and the DPP, which offer contrasting visions of Taiwan’s relationship with China and its own national identity.

Today, the KMT, DPP, and CCP each represent distinct political approaches to cross-strait relations. The modern KMT no longer resembles its authoritarian past, but functions as Taiwan’s main opposition party. It generally supports closer engagement with mainland China, reduced military tension, and expanded economic and cultural ties. While it does not explicitly advocate for immediate political unification with the People’s Republic of China, it tends to favor maintaining the framework of the “1992 Consensus,” which has built-in ambiguity allowing both sides to claim there is one China while interpreting it differently. The KMT’s approach is rooted in the belief that dialogue and economic integration reduce the risk of conflict and preserve stability across the Taiwan Strait. 

The DPP, by contrast, emphasizes Taiwan’s distinct political identity and de facto sovereignty, rejecting Beijing’s assertion that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China. The party tends to be skeptical of frameworks that imply eventual unification under CCP rule, instead prioritizing building up Taiwan. It focuses on strengthening Taiwan’s democratic institutions, expanding international participation, and building defensive capabilities to deter coercion. From the DPP’s perspective, engagement without security guarantees risks undermining Taiwan’s autonomy, especially given China’s growing military capabilities and increasing political pressure. The CCP, for its part, continues to assert that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China and that reunification is a core national goal, while officially maintaining a preference for “peaceful reunification” alongside the option of force if necessary.

The contrast between the KMT and DPP reflects deeper disagreements about identity and security beyond policy differences. The KMT generally frames Taiwan as part of a broader Chinese cultural and historical community, whereas the DPP reflects a Taiwanese national identity separate from China. These differences shape how each party evaluates peace strategies. For the KMT, engagement is a pathway to reducing tensions and preventing escalation, while the DPP sees deterrence and international partnerships as essential to preventing coercion or forced unification. Perhaps the most important partnership for the DPP is with the United States, Taiwan’s unofficial security guarantor, but many wonder how much help the U.S. can provide given that it seems to have its hands full with wars in Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran. 

Could reunification ever be a peaceful solution? Proponents of reunification argue that it would produce economic and geopolitical benefits. A unified political framework could integrate markets across the Taiwan Strait, increase efficiency, and reduce the risk of military conflict. It may also alleviate a major source of tension between China and the United States. From Beijing’s perspective, reunification would also fulfill a long-standing nationalist objective tied to sovereignty and historical continuity.

However, the potential costs of reunification are significant. Taiwan’s democratic political system could be fundamentally altered under a reunified arrangement with China, raising concerns about political freedoms, rule of law, and civil liberties. Public opinion in Taiwan increasingly reflects a distinct Taiwanese identity rather than a Chinese one, meaning that unification could be met with heavy resistance. There are also substantial risks of instability during any transition, given the vastly different legal, political, and economic systems on each side of the strait. Moreover, if reunification were pursued through coercion or military force, it could trigger a major regional or even global conflict, particularly given the strategic interests of the United States and its allies. 

Given these factors, many analysts argue that the current status quo, though imperfect, remains the least risky arrangement. The status quo is built on strategic ambiguity: Taiwan does not formally declare independence, China does not formally renounce the use of force, and the United States maintains a policy of deterrence without explicit commitment to either outcome. This arrangement has prevented large-scale conflict for decades, but it works in part because each side interprets it differently and because the costs of changing it unilaterally are extremely high. As such, it is not a stable resolution – it can more accurately be characterized as a managed tension that requires constant calibration. 

It is uncertain whether this status quo will hold in the long term. On one hand, economic interdependence, particularly in high-tech supply chains, continues to create incentives for stability. On the other hand, rising nationalism in China, growing Taiwanese identity, and intensifying competition between the U.S. and China are placing increasing strain on the arrangement. 

Ultimately, peaceful solutions to cross-strait tensions are less about achieving a mutually satisfying political end state than minimizing the risk of war. The KMT’s engagement-focused approach, the DPP’s deterrence-oriented strategy, and the CCP’s reunification goal represent fundamentally incompatible visions. In this context, the most viable path to peace is likely not reunification or independence, but the continued management of ambiguity through a combination of dialogue, deterrence, and economic interdependence. While this does not resolve the underlying dispute, it remains the approach most likely to prevent conflict in the foreseeable future, making it the pragmatic – albeit imperfect – foundation for peace.