On Sunday, January 18, the Syrian government announced a ceasefire with the Syrian Defense Force, giving the Syrian government almost complete control of the country. The agreement follows weeks of skirmishes in the Aleppo governorate, and more recently along and beyond the Euphrates, territory controlled by the S.D.F. The agreement outlines the dismantling of the S.D.F., with its members joining Syria’s military and security forces. The S.D.F. will also be allowed to propose a list of high-ranking officials to fill senior military, security, and civilian posts in the national government, in an effort to increase unity between the forces. Finally, the agreement will see the Syrian government moving into the three governorates previously controlled by the S.D.F.: al-Hasakah, Deir ez Zor, and Raqqa. Ultimately, this ceasefire paves the way for a consolidated and unified Syria.

Skirmishes between the Syrian government and the S.D.F. escalated on January 6, as the Syrian government began attempting to flush the S.D.F. out of the Aleppo governorate. Eventually, the fighting moved eastward, just breaking past the Euphrates River boundary, which the U.S. warned the Syrian government not to cross. Regardless, after the Syrian government seemed poised to advance deeper into S.D.F. territory, the ceasefire was called, bringing an immediate end to the fighting. 

During the chaos of the Syrian civil war, as the Islamic State stretched its reach across Syria, the S.D.F. was created, backed militarily by the Kurdish People’s Protection Unit (Y.P.G.). The goal of the S.D.F. was to create a secular, democratic, and federalized Syria; largely, however, their focus was on supporting what they believed to be an autonomous Kurdish region in the north-east region of Syria. The S.D.F. became a key ally for the U.S. in fighting against I.S.I.S., as well as combating the Assad regime. Turkiye, however, views the S.D.F. as an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a party the Turkish government deems a terrorist group. Not wanting to support the S.D.F. or the Assad regime, the Turkish government grew ties with various rebel factions in the Idlib governorate of Syria. This conglomeration of groups eventually became the group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (H.T.S.).

After cementing Turkiye’s support, the H.T.S. began to make huge territorial gains in late 2024, invading and holding Aleppo, quickly turning towards Damascus, and overthrowing the Assad regime in just a few weeks. In Damascus, the leader of the H.T.S., Abu Mohammad al-Julani, shed his war name and opted for his birthname: Ahmad al-Sharaa. The H.T.S. formed the Syrian interim government, and democracy, liberalization, and creating stability in Syria became the primary concerns of the new government. They then looked to create a united Syria.

In March 2025, the two sides began negotiations to reintegrate S.D.F. territories into the national Syrian government. After various postponements, with each side accusing the other of violating the deal, the talks escalated into conflict in early January. The S.D.F. held de facto autonomy in the north-northeastern region of Syria for a very long time; the Kurds’ desire to govern themselves, combined with historic prejudice against them in Syria, led to uneasy tensions that worsened after the agreements in March. Al-Sharaa has been linked to violence against ethnic minorities, specifically the Druze and Alawite communities. Potentially out of fear of discrimination or being treated as second-class citizens, the Kurdish-led S.D.F. continuously pushed back against the Syrian government. On Friday, January 16, al-Sharaa affirmed Kurdish Syrians’ rights. He granted Syrian citizenship to Kurds, allowing them to better represent themselves, and he adopted Kurdish as a new national language. 

The question that remains: are al-Sharaa’s assurances of equal rights and inclusion credible? Gregory Waters, a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project at the Atlantic Council, reports, “The components of the new Syrian government have a mixed track record of treatment towards Kurds. The factions that came from Idlib, most notably Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, have no serious history of ethnic targeting of Kurds, while several Syrian National Army (S.N.A.) factions, which now serve in parts of the new army, have been sanctioned for years for systematic abuses against Kurds in northern Aleppo. It is now up to Damascus to ensure these ex-S.N.A. factions no longer abuse or exploit Kurdish communities.” Ultimately, regardless of whether the S.D.F.’s wariness is well-founded or not, now they don’t have much of a choice; unless they want to escalate the conflict further. What steps, then, can the al-Sharaa government take to ensure stability with the Kurds and guarantee the fighting ends? 

The first and most crucial step in advancing unity between Kurds and Arab Syrians is one that al-Sharaa is already moving towards: granting fair political representation to the Kurds. By allowing Kurdish interests to be addressed in the federal government, the Syrian government opens up a space for more complete dialogue. Federal representation could also reduce the S.D.F.’s desires for decentralization. 

In addition to improving representation, the government must focus on strengthening institutions, not just in the northeast, but throughout the country. By solidifying the power of institutions across the nation, ethnic groups will begin to gain confidence in the institution’s ability to carry out their interests, and trust in the government will grow. 

Of course, simply improving representation in government won’t solve the outstanding tradition of discrimination against Kurds and other ethnic minorities in Syria. Here is the more difficult aspect of my recommendation: radical education reform. There must be a broad ideological shift regarding the openness of the Syrian identity. This can be implemented in many different ways. One way would include teaching Kurdish as well as other ethnic groups’ history in schools: by demonstrating the impact that each ethnic group has had on one another within the country and highlighting the cycles of violence that occur as a result of being closed off from the other group, there can begin to be a broader sense of unity; if we don’t come together, then we’ll continue to fight until we’re all in the ground. By implementing rhetoric like this in schools, future generations will grow up to be significantly more wary of fighting their neighbors. 

Another approach the Syrian government could take to address older populations, who are much more stuck in their ways, would be to enact laws against discrimination against different ethnic groups. By differentiating between crimes committed with an ethnocentric motivation versus other types of motivation, the government can create stricter punishments. This will serve to discourage discrimination on a broader scale. To promote even more goodwill amongst the ethnic groups, the creation of a ministry focused on documenting crimes committed against ethnic minorities may be necessary. Again, by doing so, ethnic groups can witness atrocities committed against one another and be discouraged from falling into old patterns of hatred. 

Many actors may be opposed to these policies: Turkiye would most likely not be in favor of granting political rights to Kurdish groups; however, I do believe that the Syrian government gaining control of the territory in the northeast would work to sway their opinions. If Turkiye has a sympathetic neighbor bordering its own Kurdish-centered land, then it may feel better about granting political rights to Kurds in Syria. Other actors that wouldn’t be too happy with granting political rights to Kurds would be various Arab nationalist factions, as well as strands of the S.N.A. that exist within the Syrian government’s military. These will be the most delicate interests to balance: al-Sharaa could not implement extremely harsh anti-discrimination laws too quickly, as that would seriously anger these two groups. Therefore, I put the focus on education reform, by promoting the message of a unified Syria, these anti-ethnic minority groups will become smaller and smaller, until further methods of punishment can be carried out to squash illiberal ideals. 

These policy ideas are obviously incredibly idealistic; however, they don’t appear to be so far off from the rhetoric that al-Sharaa has been pushing since he came into power. Frankly, the skirmishes that occurred between March 2025 and January 2026 should have never occurred; al-Sharaa should’ve shifted his focus onto granting equal representation to Kurds much earlier, to dissuade any allegations that he might discriminate against Kurds, especially if he promotes a more liberal vision of Syria. 

Ultimately, al-Sharaa could’ve avoided conflict with the S.D.F. if he had been more convincing in his approach to equal rights amongst all Syrians. From now on, al-Sharaa must be committed to advancing equal rights amongst all minority groups, through policies such as education reform, to create a more stable Syria. If not, Syria may fall back into old patterns of violence.