​Armed assailants killed at least 22 civilians in northwest Burkina Faso last week. This is the latest deadly attack in a region struggling with long-term militant activity.

The attackers raided a rural commune in the province of Kossi, which is approximately 55 kilometers from the country’s border with Mali. According to a statement by Regional Governor Babo Pierre Bassinga, “the provisional death toll…is 22 dead, several wounded and material damage.” Bassinga’s statement also stated that military forces have been deployed to the scene of the attack and that measures are in place to host those who fled to nearby cities.

Since 2015, Burkina Faso has been battling Islamist militants active in northern regions, some of whom have links to al-Qaeda and ISIL. The fighting has displaced more than 1.85 million in the country and killed thousands across the Sahel region. In January, army officers overthrew Burkina Faso’s president in response to escalating attacks and vowed to improve security, but levels of violence have remained high since.

Burkina Faso’s situation is rooted in a separatist movement that began in Mali in 2012. In recent years, armed groups with links to Islamic extremist groups have competed for influence in the security vacuum in Mali’s central regions. Meanwhile, communal tensions have been exacerbated by the groups and further driven by climate change. The resulting insecurity spread into neighboring countries Burkina Faso and Niger, as well as the broader region. Analysts say that the military coups in Mali and Burkina Faso have caused institutional insecurity which has enabled the violence to continue.

Last month, armed men killed at least 100 civilians in another rural district in northern Burkina Faso, the deadliest attack the country has seen in at least a year. More than 530 violent incidents occurred between February and May in the country, which is more than twice the numbers that occurred in the same period of 2021, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project.

To remedy the violence, the military government announced last month that it would be establishing two military zones, one of which will be near Kossi. The government gave civilians two weeks to leave their homes in advance of military operations, raising concerns that it would further worsen the crisis of displaced people.

In June, a mediator from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) said that authorities controlled just 60 percent of Burkina Faso. The state’s incapacity to establish authority is a major contributor to the violence. Rural regions have been the most affected, where the government’s inability to establish order has led to a rise in violence, banditry, and land disputes. Meanwhile, a rising distrust among villagers toward the government and elites has been exploited by Jihadists and used to establish a foothold in such regions. Members of the Islamist militant groups include herders and farmers who have been victimized by land-related injustices, gold miners seeking protections, and other stigmatized groups.

The state has responded to the crisis with military force, with limited support from French troops. These counter-terrorism efforts, however, have led to the killing rather than capturing of suspects and to the abuse of civilians. This response has led more Burkinabe to feel unjustly affected by state violence and pushed more toward militant groups.

To make up for the shortcomings of the state’s security forces, the Burkina authorities have encouraged the establishment of community-based defense groups made up of local volunteers and vigilantes. However–especially given that these types of groups are what led to the rise of community-based violence–militarizing rural communities can only worsen the bloodshed and aggravate local divisions.

In the short term, Burkina authorities should limit the use of force and the involvement of vigilante groups in counter-insurgency efforts. They should also opt to revitalize the penal system and step away from the killing rather than the arrest of alleged Jihadists. This would restore confidence in the nation’s security and limit the state-led abuses which Jihadist groups take advantage of. Instead, a strategy should be devised that combines prevention, mitigation, and post-crisis stabilization, acutely tailoring the plan to each local context. Military action remains essential, but it is necessary to balance the military approach with non-military responses.

In the long term, the state must address the political roots of the conflict, meaning reforms need to be implemented to address rural divisions. Experts from the Crisis Group argue that the 2009 Rural Land Law should be revised to reconcile the interests of different populations and ease tensions between indigenous and non-indigenous populations.