On November 28, 1984, Casper W. Weinberger made a speech at the National Press Club. During his speech titled “The Uses of Military Power,” then-US Defense Secretary said, “I have developed six major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad.”

1. The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.
2. If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning.
3. If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives.
4. The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed — their size, composition and disposition — must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.
5. Before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.
6. The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort

And he said, “I believe that these tests can be helpful in deciding whether or not we should commit our troops to combat in the months and years ahead.” Weinberger’s six-point checklist, later known as the “Weinberger doctrine,” played a vital role in the 1991 Gulf War.

As the war enters its fourth month, an overlooked question remains: would the conflict have passed the test established by former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger in 1984? President Trump and his cabinet members disregard many of the major tests. While it is an ongoing war at least as of June 5, 2026, some available information is useful.

Of course, there are some criticisms of the 1984 doctrine and its application to the current war with the Islamic Republic. One criticism is that the Doctrine was conceived in a very different era than the one we are in today. The US employed mainly air power and special operations to achieve the military and political goals abroad. Moreover, the Weinberger doctrine wasn’t law or obligation, but just a recommendation. (Some Reagan administration members, including State Secretary George P. Schultz, often criticized the doctrine.)

However, the evaluation of Operation Epic Fury by using the 1984 doctrine is still useful. Unlike other military operations in the last two decades, the use of force against Tehran is a de facto war. While the operation employs mainly air and sea powers, destroying nuclear development and trying regime change are no longer usual military operations. Here is the checklist on US war with Iran, mainly based on the April 7 New York Times article on decision-making behind the Operation Epic Fury.

1. Is it vital interest? – Maybe. Iran’s nuclear development might pose a huge threat to the US and the Gulf nations. Especially for Israel, “the risks of inaction were greater than the risks of action,” as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel said on February 11 at the White House. However, it is doubtful that Iran’s nuclear armament is more vital for Washington than the possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan and the further encroachment by Russia in Europe.

2. The clear intention of winning: At least Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had. During the meeting with the American counterpart, his team presented the near-certain victory, underestimated the risk of Strait of Hormuz’s closure, and concluded that attacks against Iran could accelerate the Iranian regime’s collapse by inciting mass protest inside the country and the help by the Kurdish forces. President Trump said to Netanyahu, “sounds good.”

However, Many U.S. officials did not appear to share that confidence. John Ratcliffe, the CIA director, described the Israeli prime minister’s proposal as “farcical.” Dan Caine, the chairman of Joint Chief Staff, was also skeptical of the plan, saying “this is, in my experience, standard operation procedure for the Israelis. They oversell, and their plans are not always well-developed. They know they need us, and that’s why they’re hard-selling.” It is argued that many of the Trump administration’s members had no clear intention of winning, especially if the attacks intensified.

3. Defined political and military objectives and with the capacity to accomplish those objectives: One day after Israeli Prime Minister’s presentation, the US intelligence officials assessed and broke it down into four parts: Killing the Ayatollah Khamenei, crippling Iran’s capacity to project power and threaten its neighbors, popular uprising inside Iran, and regime change by installing a secular leader. They concluded the first two objectives were achievable with American intelligence and military power, but the third and fourth parts were unrealistic. However, the Trump administration tried to accomplish all objectives through air bombings.

4. The relationship between the objectives and the size and composition of the forces committed should be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary- No. The Trump administration initially tried to change the Iranian regime only by air-bombing. Many international relations and security scholars argued that air power alone isn’t enough to conduct regime change. Compared with other wars in the Middle East, this one is significantly different. During the Gulf War, Washington deployed 697,000 troops to drive the Iraqis from neighboring Kuwait. As for the 2003 Iraq War, 150,000 to 192,000 US personnel were deployed. However, Operation Epic Fury deploys only 50,000.

5. Reasonable Assurance of the support of the US public and Congress- The evidence suggests otherwise. The NBC News poll soon after the war suggested that 52% of responders opposed the military intervention against Iran, and 41% supported it. Needless to say, there is no congressional approval. The lack of congressional approval raises broader concerns about democratic accountability and the legitimacy of military action in a constitutional system. (The US House of Representatives passed the resolution to demand the authorization of war on June 3.)

6. The commitment of US troops as a last resort- Doubtful. After the February 26 talks, Oman’s foreign minister, who mediated the talks between Washington and Tehran, said: “significant progress has been made.” And he continued, “Two sides planned to resume negotiations soon.” If diplomacy still had a realistic chance of success, the justification for military action becomes considerably weaker.

There are two modifications of the Weinberger Doctrine. Firstly, evaluate the use of force based on checklists, especially defined goals, and whether it is a last resort. These could be applied to Trump administration’s other military operations, including the January 3 raid on then-Venezuelan president Nicholas Maduro.

The updated version of the Weinberger Doctrine should have one addition: the consent from allies. In the past, the coordination and cooperation with alliances were key to the success of the US military operation, such as the 1991 Gulf War. One reason why US allies, including Japan and NATO members, don’t actively engage in the current conflict between Washington and Tehran might be that the United States didn’t let them know in advance, except for Israel. The United States has a network of alliances in Europe, Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, and beyond. There is no reason not to use them effectively.

The United States’ power seems to decline relatively. Although the US has the world’s highest defense expenditure, the share of the US military budget in global spending declined from 45% in 2010 to 33% in 2026, due to military buildups by Moscow, Beijing, and other Western nations. In an era of great-power rivalry with China and Russia, the United States can no longer assume it can fight major conflicts without broad allied support and clearly defined objectives. This is why the revised Weinberger Doctrine remains relevant and will provide wiser statecraft.