UN Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty Enters Into Force: What Does It Mean For Global Disarmament?

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), often referred to as the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty, officially entered into force on 22 January 2021. The landmark treaty, the first of its kind, obligates signatories to refrain from the development and testing of nuclear weapons and enforces remediation on the impacts of testing. The announcement that the treaty would enter into force, confirmed by the 50th ratification of its terms by Honduras in October 2020 and compliant with Article 5(1), has been met with limited celebration. Lacking the signature of all nine nuclear-weapon states and many other key nuclear supporters, the treaty has been criticized and refuted by both the U.S. and NATO. So, what does it really mean for disarmament in 2021?

As opposed to the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the TPNW’s principal aim is the total elimination of nuclear weapons, rather than their non-proliferation. Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesman for the UN Secretary-General António Guterres, argued that the treaty “represents a meaningful commitment towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which remains the highest disarmament priority of the United Nations,” although prominent critics have insisted that in seeking immediate disarmament without proper verification measures, the treaty instead serves to undermine the more widely accepted NPT.

“The nuclear-weapon states themselves testify to the TPNW’s effectiveness by their campaign against it,” suggested Thomas Hajnoczi, outgoing Director of Arms Control at the Austrian Foreign Ministry recently. “The US has been on record at the UN to declare that they seek a world free of nuclear weapons… it is not the concept of the TPNW that is contentious, rather it is the fact that it has been put into existence… without waiting for the nuclear-weapon states.”

While the treaty might face its notable detractors, Hajnoczi is shrewd to suggest that the TPNW might not be as toothless as it appears. The absence of the nuclear weapons states underscores the importance—not the weaknesses—of the TPNW, a movement that condemns the weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their supporters as relics of colonial power and Cold War geopolitics. In providing an international framework to make the weapons illegal, it delegitimizes their possession even in non-party states, challenging the hegemony a small number of countries have held over the weapons for decades. The realities of new great power competition and threats to peace and security in the 21st century do not necessitate the expensive modernization and expansion of nuclear arsenals. Rather, they remind us of the indiscriminate dangers of nuclear weapons, and the need to remove them from the world. Unlike the NPT, the TPNW treats all states as equals in that conversation.

The existence of the NPT, which celebrated its 50th-anniversary last year, has been the foundation of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament for much of the weapons’ history but enables a monopoly on the ownership of nuclear weapons for a few states. Although the end of the Cold War saw huge reductions in global arsenals, the NPT’s impetus on non-proliferation puts states party to it under no obligation to disarm within any timeframe. The TPNW, conversely, mandates total elimination and introduces remediation for damages caused by nuclear testing and the prevention of nuclear material sharing.

Nuclear weapons still number more than 13,400 worldwide, according to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), the chief coordinator of the treaty, but all nuclear-weapon states are currently undergoing expensive arsenal modernization and renewal programs. The divide between nuclear-weapon states and the rest of the world in the acceptance of the treaty has been grounded in the historical disparity in nuclear ownership, often viewed as an instrument of colonialism.

Under these pretenses, the success of the TPNW might appear limited but the establishment of international norms such as this can go a long way in arms control. The U.S. has also not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, but the illegality of the weapons has led to cuts in their production, while similar treaties for other WMDs like chemical weapons has shifted how the world views continued possessors of them.

While the U.S. is unlikely to commit to destroying its nuclear weapons under the treaty, the Biden administration can signal intent for reductions by rejoining or renegotiating treaties abandoned under Trump, including the JCPoA, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and New START. It should also cease trying to undercut the objectives of the TPNW by identifying areas of commonality. The 2020 Democratic Party Platform promised to expand the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act to include those harmed by U.S. nuclear testing, similar to the terms of the treaty. These might not directly support the TPNW, but at least signal that the U.S. is willing to constructively encourage disarmament of a weapon with untold humanitarian devastation.

Shane Ward
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