On February 9th, the Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi held a press conference at the headquarters of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (L.D.P.). After obtaining a clear mandate by Japanese voters and a two-thirds majority in the Lower House in the February 8th snap election, the 67-year-old Prime Minister stated some policy priorities. One was strengthening Japan’s intelligence.
“We’ll work on the reinforcement of the intelligence capabilities. We’ll strengthen information analysis capabilities and make the system that prevents crises from happening and protects the national interests strategically,” said Takaichi at the press conference (L.D.P.). One specific plan she highlighted was the creation of the National Intelligence Bureau (N.I.B.).
Takaichi outlined the possible reform of Japan’s intelligence at the February 20th Policy Speech. The Prime Minister proposed elevating the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (C.I.R.O.), the intelligence agency within the Japanese Cabinet, to the N.I.B., which will aggregate and utilize information from relevant agencies. At the same time, she emphasized taking “all necessary measures, such as improving the design of our systems that prevent undue foreign interference,” (Prime Minister’s Office of Japan).
The L.D.P. is ready to support Takaichi’s plan. The public broadcaster N.H.K. reported on March 6th that the party’s meeting approved the legislation to create the N.I.B. and the Japanese-version of the National Intelligence Council (N.I.C.), composed of the prime minister and cabinet ministers. They also reported that the Takaichi administration would submit the legislation to the Diet in mid-March. As of April 2nd, Japan’s Lower House started to discuss the legislation to establish the N.I.C. and N.I.B.
Takaichi seems dedicated to implementing the two-tack reforms: intelligence and counterintelligence. Intelligence refers to the process of gathering and analyzing information, whereas counterintelligence deters foreign spy activities and possible terrorism. While the creation of the N.I.B. falls under intelligence, the prevention of foreign influence and espionage is considered counterintelligence. What drives Takaichi and her L.D.P. members to reform Japan’s intelligence community? Looking at their history shows the vulnerability of the country’s intelligence system.
Japan As A Spy Heaven
In 1982, a Soviet man stood at the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (H.P.S.C.I.). The man, Stanislav Levchenko, defected to the United States in 1979 after his stint in Tokyo as a K.G.B. agent. During his years in Japan, Levchenko had more than 200 Japanese collaborators, including a newspaper reporter, the former chairman of Japan’s Socialist Party (J.S.P.), and even the former Labor Minister. However, Japanese authorities were unable to apprehend any of them due to a lack of evidence and insufficient laws to punish foreign agents and those who hand over national secrets to authorities. Levchenko’s statements sent shock waves not only to Washington, but also to Tokyo: He described Japan as a “spy heaven.”
Historically, Japan is no stranger to intelligence. In the pre-World War II era, the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces had the so-called “Tokumu,” or special service, branches that were responsible for both information gathering and analysis and psychological and influence campaigns. Some Tokumu branches played crucial roles in Japan’s intervention in Siberia and the invasion of Manchuria through both covert and overt operations.
However, the end of World War II changed the situation dramatically. General Headquarters (G.H.Q.), the Allied-controlled body that governed Japan from 1945 to 1952, disbanded Japan’s military and its special service branches, partly due to their involvement in Japan’s invasion of Asian nations. Moreover, as Yosiki Kobayashi, a professor at Meiji University, argued in his 2021 book Essentials of Intelligence, Japan’s reliance on the United States over security issues seemed to give less incentive to create a strong intelligence apparatus.
Furthermore, the memory of the Special High Police (S.H.P.) might give the Japanese public a negative view on intelligence. The S.H.P., established in 1910, was initially responsible for cracking down on extremist ideology, especially left-wing ideology that could threaten Japan’s imperial house. However, as Japan slid into militarism in the 1930s, the S.H.P. suppressed not only both left and right-wing extremists, but also anti-war activists, and even committed human rights violations like torture. While the G.H.Q. dissolved the S.H.P. in 1945, these memories left the Japanese public with the impression that intelligence, especially counterintelligence, could threaten civil liberties, one of the sacred values in post-war Japan.
All of this accounts for why severe reactions to intelligence reform have occurred several times in Japan’s post-war history. In 1985, after the Levchenko incident, the L.D.P. and then-Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone tried to pass the anti-espionage law, whose maximum sentence was the death penalty. Following criticism from Japanese left-wing factions, such as the J.S.P. and the Japan Communist Party, and many media accounts that the law could lead to human rights abuses, Nakasone and the L.D.P. withdrew the proposal. Even in 2013, 68 years after the war, an N.H.K. poll showed the approval rating of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who passed the Specially Designated Secrets Act, which protects top secrets and punishes public servants for leaking them, dropped by 10%.
Compared to the past, the Japanese public might accept Takaichi’s proposal of intelligence reforms. While there is no poll over the issues as of April 10th, 2026, the reaction by Japanese media and public is muted, excluding liberal and left-wing responses. This might be because Japan’s national security environment has become more severe than in 1985 and 2013, considering China’s economic coercion and threat to annex Taiwan, North Korea’s missile and nuclear issues, and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, the reform might respond to the call for Tokyo’s greater cooperation, and even cement the joining of the “Five Eyes,” the intelligence alliance between the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada (Nikkei Asia, The Japan Times).
Given that Takaichi has enjoyed a high approval rating and a clear mandate by Japanese voters, legislation to reform the intelligence apparatus is likely to be approved in both chambers of the Diet. While the L.D.P.’s governing coalition and the pro-business Japan Innovation Party falls short of a majority in the Upper House, they could override it by passing the law in the Lower House. However, even with Takaichi’s reforms, Japan’s Intelligence Community (I.C.) might not be revolutionized.
Crying Wine And Selling Vinegar?
One possible problem is the so-called “comprehensive coordination authority.” On March 3rd, Takayuki Kobatashi, the L.D.P. Policy Chief, proposed that the newly established intelligence bureau should have the authority to analyze information gathered by each intelligence agency in a unified and comprehensive manner (Yahoo! Japan). However, similar power exists in the current C.I.R.O., which is expected to be transformed into the N.I.B. The C.I.R.O., an intelligence agency established in 1986, is responsible for gathering and analyzing information critical to cabinet policymaking and coordinating other intelligence agencies. The current reform plan might not be any different than the C.I.R.O., at least for now.
Looking at their U.S. counterpart may benefit Japan’s reform plans. After the September 11th attacks in 2001, Washington implemented several reforms to make the intelligence community more efficient and coordinated. One was the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (O.D.N.I.), responsible not only for coordinating the seventeen U.S. intelligence agencies, but also for budget management and personnel authority. Some might argue that Japan has never experienced a crisis like September 11th. However, if Takaichi and the L.D.P. hope to create a more centralized and efficient I.C., the N.I.B. should possess authority comparable to that of the O.D.N.I.
Furthermore, the possible counterintelligence legislation must be accountable to the Japanese people. Of course, current Japan is not Imperial Japan: As long as the Japanese Constitution enshrines human rights and democratic norms, human rights abuses committed by the S.H.P. are unlikely to happen again. However, intelligence reforms must be accompanied by stronger democratic oversight to ensure that national security does not undermine civil liberties. Unlike the United States and the United Kingdom, Japan has never had oversight committees on the intelligence service in the Diet. The possible expansion of the intelligence apparatus needs checks and balances.
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The call for the drastic reform of Japan’s intelligence community is not new. However, Takaichi has the mandate and the powers to execute it. Unlike the pre-war era, Japan could make a new I.C. system that balances intelligence services and human rights. If implemented carefully, the reform could modernize Japan’s intelligence system while preserving the democratic values that define post-war Japan.
