Russia has recently withdrawn from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), an agreement that has long been regarded as a cornerstone of European security. The decision was made in response to President Vladimir Putin’s decree, and received unanimous approval from both chambers of the State Duma on May 16th. This withdrawal has undermined a crucial arms control mechanism that has been in place for 33 years, the CFE, jeopardizing the pursuit of peace and collective security on the continent. 

Following Russia’s withdrawal from the Open Skies agreements in 2021 and suspension from the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty in 2023, this event is widely viewed as yet “part of a pattern of actions that systematically undermines Euro-Atlantic security,” (Statement of NATO, 09/06/2023). However, the reasons for such a move remain superficial. Andrey Kartapolov, the chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Defense, has justified the decision by accusing NATO countries of surpassing the treaty’s limits, citing events in Ukraine and the potential accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO as factors (OSW, 17/05/2023). However, it is important to recognize that this decision primarily reflects Russia’s intent to politically position itself in opposition to any cooperative security relations with the West, rather than being driven by genuine arms control’ concerns.  

Indeed, I think we must acknowledge that Russia has consistently pursued a policy of unilaterally rejecting the CFE Treaty for “more than a decade” (Keir Giles, Russia expert at Chatham House). In July 2007, Russia suspended its adherence to the treaty and ceased fulfilling its obligations regarding information provision. This decision was motivated by the failure of NATO countries to ratify the Russian intended revised version of the treaty. Furthermore, in 2015, Russia withdrew from the Joint Consultative Group, which had the responsibility of overseeing the treaty’s implementation. I thus strongly believe that the time has come for the West to reassess its understanding of the post-Cold War European security framework with a modus vivendi that can ensure lasting peace on the continent, even without relying on close collaboration with Moscow. 

In fact, the current landscape is vastly different from the conditions prevailing in 1990, when the Treaty was ratified as the Cold War came to an end. The Treaty entailed precise restrictions on five categories of offensive weaponry: tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery units with a calibre of 100mm or higher, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters. These limitations governed the deployment of such armaments by both alliances across Europe, spanning from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals. The overarching objective of the CFE Treaty, alongside the Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty, was to establish a robust framework for European security that could foster enduring peace. These agreements were built upon the foundation of mutually reinforcing and legally binding commitments, with the aim of curbing arms proliferation and guarding against any sudden acts of aggression. 

There is no doubt that the consequences of this withdrawal reach well beyond the borders of Europe, with significant global implications for maintaining peace. The ideological opposition to the West, evident in this decision, adds another layer of significance to its worldwide impact. The proliferation of arms stands as a substantial threat to world peace, emphasizing the urgent necessity for effective measures to address and mitigate this issue, even in time of confrontation. Furthermore, the redefinition of the security architecture in Europe, which may not be as consensual as it was during the ratification of the CFE, becomes an imperative in response to the changing circumstances.