Sweden, Finland, And NATO: What This Means for Security In Europe

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, the security configuration in Europe has drastically changed. It has prompted applications to join the European Union (EU) from several countries in the region along with applications for NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Sweden and Finland, traditionally neutral countries, have submitted applications for NATO membership, prompting various responses from the international community. Turkey, a NATO member since the 1950s, has objected in response to policies by Sweden and Finland regarding Turkey’s relations with Kurds in the east. Whether or not Sweden and Finland become NATO members, there are already major security implications underway in how Russia views the rest of Europe and the prospects of other countries joining similar Western alliances.

In mid-May, both countries submitted written applications to join NATO, which was met with swift opposition from Turkey. Additionally, Russia has cut off gas supplies to Finland over its NATO aspirations, but also due to Finland not paying for Russian gas in rubles as stated in Russia’s “unfriendly” countries list, according to BBC. Turkey’s opposition to NATO membership of Sweden and Finland has to do with these countries not having a “clear, open attitude towards terrorist organisations,” President of Turkey Erdoğan said. This refers to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Turkey has designated a “terrorist group,” and other armed Kurdish groups active in Turkey and its periphery,” Al Jazeera reports. Other issues have to do with the countries not extraditing individuals associated with “the PKK or to the Gulen movement, which is blamed by Turkey for a 2016 coup attempt” and arms exports.

These developments are important given that for the admission of new NATO members, all 30 current members must have consensus on admitting aspiring countries, according to information from Associated Press. Turkey has demanded a firmer stance by Sweden and Finland on issues related to Kurds and other Turkey specific demands, which have been a focus in recent meetings between the three countries’ foreign delegations. As of late May, there have been no breakthroughs in the dialogues, though this is subject to change over the coming weeks and months. Regardless of whether or not Sweden and Finland become official NATO members, there are other important implications to consider regarding the broader state of security in Europe.

For instance, neighboring countries to the EU, such as Moldova and Georgia have applied for membership in the bloc in light of the war. Other countries, such as Hungary, have extended their state of emergency due to potential dangers from the Ukraine war, according to President Viktor Orbán. Western countries, such as Germany, France, the United States, and others, have continued to deliver equipment and aid to Ukraine. On the other hand, Russia has intensified its campaigns on anti-war protesters and dialogue, with President Putin seeking to create a more unified voice favoring the war, though it has proven to be a challenge. Dissidents such as Alexei Navalny continue time in jail and are facing grim prospects of a trial abiding by the rule of law. Additionally, Russian assets abroad continue being seized and frozen, and Russians outspoken against the war have also been blacklisted from returning.

What does this mean for European security? First, there is a growing East-West dynamic that is in ways similar to that of the Cold War with the Iron Curtain separating communist leaning countries from Western capitalist leaning countries. In today’s context, it takes the form of pro-war/pro-Russia and anti-war countries. Second, the amount of aid Ukraine has received to fend off Russian troops and interests in its territory highlights the West’s security priorities in Europe versus elsewhere in the world. Similar conflicts in Africa and Asia have received lesser attention, though with the Ukraine war, the West is able to frame it as a war against the Russian regime, autocracy, and illiberalism, meaning there are broader ideological implications as well. Lastly, these events have shifted existing perceptions of the security configuration of Europe, most notably the general unity of the EU bloc and NATO against Russian actions in Ukraine. However, these trends are already shifting, such as member Hungary paying for Russian gas in rubles and opposing Russian gas sanctions due to its energy needs. Within months, these security trends changed, and as the war continues, they will continue to change. There may be other countries aspiring to join NATO and/or the EU, which will also contribute to the shifting security dynamics underway.

The Ukraine war is challenging existing assumptions about Europe’s security configurations while also introducing new elements to the many moving security pieces. Irrespective of Sweden and Finland joining NATO, the security order in Europe is becoming firmer in that there are pro-Russia and pro-West camps, and physical borders are not restrictive of it. How these dynamics continue to change, or not change, in the coming weeks and months is essential in further understanding the effects of the Ukraine war in relation to security.

Related