On March 4th, 2026, Iranian forces declared the Strait of Hormuz “closed.” Roughly 20 percent of global LNG, one third of the world’s fertiliser, and 20 million barrels of oil passed through the Strait in 2025, exposing the cost of energy dependence on conflict-prone chokepoints. Since Iran shut the Strait, global energy markets have faced significant disruption and panic; Gulf states are accelerating their pivots to other forms of energy, including hydrogen, as an export model that can bypass these chokepoints. However, this is being done without agreed international standards. Without these standards, the pivot towards energy diversification and greener transitions risks becoming another arena of power competition rather than a foundation for stability.

The standards governing this new architecture are being written by actors who are not waiting for the crisis to end. The Gulf International Forum noted that Gulf states are developing hydrogen-centered export models, such as Saudi Arabia’s $8.4 billion NEOM green hydrogen project. The Atlantic Council argued in 2024 that the U.S.-EU regulatory divergence could be exploited by Beijing, due to the gaps between the world’s two largest markets. The Middle East Council on Global Affairs found that the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, in its definitive stage from January 2026, will directly affect Gulf hydrogen exports. With these contexts, the Hormuz crisis must serve not merely as a shock, but as a catalyst.

Energy systems focused on areas of contested geography are fragile; the Gulf’s hydrogen pivot is therefore not just industrial strategy, but an instrument of economic resilience and potentially peace. Yet that promise will be diminished if the West’s own divisions turn hydrogen into a contested space. The U.S. and EU have built incompatible definitions of clean hydrogen, with no mutual recognition and no common benchmark for Gulf producers. China, holding roughly 60 percent of global electrolyser manufacturing capacity, offers financing and a single compliance pathway. Shared standards are necessary to prevent the Gulf’s energy transition from simply deepening rivalry in a region already troubled by it.

The EU has established multiple initiatives to aid its strategic autonomy objectives through energy diversification. It is aiming to import 10 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen annually by 2030, under strict RED III certification rules. By contrast, the U.S. created a domestic subsidy through the IRA’s Section 45V, which is only available for hydrogen produced on U.S. soil under a different lifecycle methodology. Although Washington’s tax credits are domestic, their potential impact extends beyond geographical borders. The subsidy fixes a rival American definition of ‘clean hydrogen’ that diverges from Europe’s. RED III blocks recognition of third-country certifications without a mutual-recognition agreement, and none exists with the U.S. A Gulf exporter therefore has no single Western benchmark to build to.

The Hormuz crisis will resolve, but its lesson should remain. These conversations on alternatives and diversification must be designed for cooperation, not competition. The April 2026 U.S.-EU critical-minerals memorandum of understanding illustrated that this form of transatlantic coordination is still achievable. The logic of setting shared standards to close the space evident in the current relationship should be extended to hydrogen, with the Gulf invited as co-author of the framework rather than treated as a passive exporter. The future of energy will rely either on shared frameworks that give Gulf states a stake in peace, or on competing standards that give them reasons to fracture.