In Ethiopia, Tigrayan defence forces of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) are fighting against the Ethiopian National Defense Force, who have partnered with troops from Eritrea and Amhara forces to form the current government of Ethiopia, led by President Abiy Ahmed. Although the parties may be divided along the lines of their social identity, the conflict itself finds origins in the societal structures in Ethiopia which have created horizontal inequalities between social groups. The current government believes that the recently overtaken TPLF, which ruled Ethiopia for decades, is a corrupt organization. As a governing body, the TPLF created an ethnic federalist system and generated a structure that benefited only themselves. Presiding over unequal yet rapid economic growth, the TPLF controlled the most powerful positions in government despite inaccurately representing Ethiopian peoples’ identities.

Since President Abiy has taken office and the conflict in Ethiopia has evolved, the government has sought to restore order and control over the territory of Ethiopia, reversing the structural inequalities the TPLF created and imposed. Moving away from the prior governing and social structures of the ethnic federalist system, the government has begun institutionalizing changes made under Abiy’s leadership, replicating the structural discrimination that occurred when the TPLF was in power by utilising violence. This violence has become largely one-sided, as asymmetries have given the Tigrayan people an increasing disadvantage, though both parties are continuing to contend to achieve their interests. Violence is not necessarily becoming increasingly destructive, but it is ongoing, and the dynamics of the conflict are further shifting. 

Though a structure-based conflict origin theory may provide for a foundational understanding of the Ethiopian conflict, it is limited in its scope. Social structures exist within a larger context. Though these systems are interwoven in aspects of society and are part of cultural norms, they are not always the single contributor or cause of unrest within a society and do not inherently account for the uniqueness of cultures within. Conflict occurs on various levels and if not applied with a comprehensive perspective, the structural level can be overreaching and oversimplifying. A remedy to this weakness exists in a synthesis between the subjectivist and objectivist approaches to how social systems generate violence, as well as the understanding of horizontal inequalities. 

Structures are instituted by people – often an elite group in power – to serve a purpose. Such is the case in Ethiopia; the systems are unnatural, yet internalized and preserved. Such societal structures are the source of many contemporary conflicts – however, a structural-based view is perhaps not comprehensive enough to capture the multidimensional nature of intrastate conflict or even conflict as a whole. There exists an interplay between structural, individual, and cultural order which requires addressing.

Though the parties involved in the Ethiopian conflict are culturally diverse, they share unarguable similarities. Similar to structural systems, culture is interwoven in daily life and shapes a person’s behaviour, perceptions, and knowledge. Culture shapes how one understands what conflict is, how it should be handled, and what constitutes an acceptable resolution. It operates at an unconscious level and defines what is fair, moral, and just. Not only do parties involved in the conflict have different goals for conflict resolution, but they also have different criteria for evaluating what successful conflict resolution looks like. However, in the case of Ethiopia, there are many similarities.

Although within each party, there exist various cultures with diverse patterns of behaviour embedded in expectations and norms, there are connections that can be drawn between the groups. The TPLF is not comprehensively representative of the cultures of the people of Tigray, and the incumbent government is not comprehensively representative of the remaining cultures found in Ethiopia like the cultures of the Oromo or the Amhara ethnic groups. While the incumbent government is seeking order and control over the territory, the various groups and cultures that share that same broad perspective have different ideas of what constitutes appropriate and successful measures of order. Nevertheless, an end is undoubtedly being sought by each party. There may never be a wholly ‘successful’ resolution of the conflict that perfectly satisfies the criteria of all parties and cultures. Still, compromise is crucial in the context of culture and conflict as a whole. 

Given the current state of the conflict in Ethiopia, it seems as though the best and most necessary path to achieving peace would be an approach that combines formal and informal processes. Formal negotiations involve very few elite actors and would lack the vigour to make the encompassing changes necessary to move towards peacebuilding in Ethiopia. Grassroots peacebuilding efforts pose a more likely solution at this stage, however, it would require mass participation by the people which may not be as feasible with animosity and violence still rampant between groups despite the desire to see an end to the conflict.

Targeting local leaders and prioritizing developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organizing resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict provide for a more comprehensive approach. The use of this track would allow for candid yet structured efforts at peacemaking while still allowing voices to be heard through the involvement of the most prominent figures of regional groups. In Ethiopia, the best case scenario would be to accomplish this by encouraging dialogue between groups via problem-solving workshops through mediators and facilitators. These smaller-scale workshops would serve as the first steps in spearheading larger-scale solutions across the country. Interactive problem-solving in this way enables the development of solutions that address the underlying causes of conflict, as each party’s needs for security, identity, participation, and autonomy could be recognized and addressed with a renewed perspective. 

An unofficial third-party mediation would be necessary for the execution of these processes in Ethiopia, as trust between parties is not well established. This third party would be process-focused and seek to enable participants to build relationships in a venue which fosters the generation of creative solutions. Ultimately, Ethiopia’s conflict is in a stage that requires proper recognition of each party, their interests, and their needs. A compound approach utilizing problem-solving workshops led by a third-party facilitator would provide the best means to begin peacebuilding in a delicate manner that enables a larger solution to be constructively worked toward.