A growing issue in contemporary conflicts is the rapid development of small-scale Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and the ensuing asymmetric advantage given to non-state actors through their use. While large military UAS have been restricted to Nation-States, the exploding international commercial market for civilian UAS has led to these systems being used by militant non-state actors. Most troubling is a lack of international regulation and the proliferation of private sales of military-grade UAS systems, including integrated thermal optics and payload capability.

The current international response to the rapid evolution of consumer UAS has been piecemeal and ineffective. The most common solution is to control exports to nations of concern; these exports include UAS systems or fundamental components for their manufacture. However, the nature of global markets makes direct export control almost useless. Non-state actors can launder UAS platforms or components through various 3rd nations without export controls and with minimal additional costs. The failure of export controls can be seen with the Iranian Shahed UAS used by Russia in Ukraine. The Shahed UAS is often filled with controlled parts from the US and EU, as discovered by Shahed attack survivors from Ukraine. In December 2023, the Ukrainian National Agency on Corruption Prevention stated that the Russian-produced Geran-2 (a copy of the Iranian Shahed UAS) included 55 parts made in the United States, 15 from China, 13 from Switzerland, and six from Japan. Iran has been subject to export controls since 2018 when the Iran nuclear agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was stalled by President Trump. Even with the most far-reaching sanctions and controls, the Iranian military is still able to produce UAS with components sold on the open international market.

The problem with regulating UAS systems is that they are part of an international arms race for unmanned technology driven by modern conflict experience in Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Gaza, and Yemen. Before the Ukraine War, developed militaries focused almost exclusively on large UAS systems like the MQ-1 Predator drone, which required infrastructure similar to manned aircraft. The experience of Ukrainian and Russian infantry has pushed developed nations into pursuing miniaturized UAS for use at the squad or individual level, as seen with the proliferation of “DJI Drones” (the name of a Chinese drone manufacture that has become synonymous with quad-copter UAS). These UAS are designed for civilian drone enthusiasts, but they have capabilities far beyond what is required for scenic photography or races in the park. For example, according to the DJI manufacturer website, the DJI FPV model has “4K/60fps video, a 150° super-wide FOV, 10km image transmission, and 28ms low latency.” in addition to First-Person-View (FPV), which is the preferred control method for ‘kamikaze’ style attacks. In short, the high frame rate, 4K resolution, first-person view, and 10-kilometer range are all factors that make the DJI UAS a military tool over a hobby tool for photographers. 

The failure to regulate the private UAS market arises from Neo-Liberal laissez-faire economics, an economic system that abhors the regulation of markets. Since UAS are incredibly popular and are a rapidly evolving technology, few Western governments are willing to craft effective regulations on export and capacity creep as they fear curbing any form of economic growth in a time of stagflation. While the United Nations might be keen on crafting proactive legislation to curb the deployment of these UAS, the United States, China, and Russia have a shared interest in keeping UAS unregulated and within a legal gray area. As seen with US drone strikes during the Obama administration, there is considerable delay between the deployment of emergent technology and legal regulation of its use on the battlefield. The window of opportunity lies within this delay for nation-states, as they can maximize their return on investment and develop doctrine of use without considering international or domestic law.    

There should be strict regulation on the sale of heavy-duty UAS systems on the open market. Systems that include optics such as thermal or infrared (night-vision) and an effective range beyond 2 kilometers should be banned from international export. Additionally, components to manufacture UAS should be tightly regulated and only exported to trusted international corporate partners subject to audit by the United States State Department or an internationally recognized body such as the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Miniaturized technology must also be controlled to prevent the upgrading of existing systems with military capabilities. UAS manufacturers should be compelled to introduce geo-fencing software to their products. Geo-fencing prevents the use of software outside of allowed national boundaries, as seen with StarLink satellite internet over Ukraine, preventing the use of StarLink within Russian territories. While these controls will not outright prevent the use of UAS by militant forces, applying regulations will hamper access to these systems by sanctioned groups and create barriers to continuing UAS deployment in conflict zones. 

There must also be a global cultural shift to condemn the use of UAS on the battlefield in the same way chemical weapons are considered immoral even to develop. If popular opinion turns against UAS, it could become more effective than any regulation created at a national level. Furthermore, if domestic populations do not support military UAS, their battlefield role will shrink. The legacy of the two World Wars in the 20th century demonstrates not all technologies are equal, with the chemical and nuclear weapon taboo shared by a majority of human beings in the 21st century. We can create a UAS taboo if like-minded individuals make their voices heard in law and politics, lest we suffer a 3rd World War dominated by swarms of UAS.