On September 2, 2024, a group of Turkish mobs, chanting “Yankee, Go Home,” assaulted two American marine officers. (The phrase “Yankee, Go Home” often symbolizes public anger against the US military and its imperial-like presence in other countries).

The individuals responsible for the assault are part of the Turkish Youth Union, a nationalist group that opposes European and American presence in Türkiye. This group is linked to the Turkish Vatan Party, a nationalist political party in the country. The justification for assaulting the two marine officers was due to America’s involvement in aiding the Israelis in the Gaza War, resulting in the enormous loss of civilians.

In response, the Turkish government arrested ten individuals involved in the attack. The lawyer representing the Turkish Youth Union said that it would appeal the court’s decision.

However, this incident reflects the complex position that Türkiye has been in ever since October 7, and more broadly, its relationship with the Israelis and Palestinians and its role in the Middle East.

In 1949, Türkiye was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel, and by the late 1950s, the two countries had started a close security partnership. Having good relations with the Turks was part of a broader Israeli strategy during the 1950s under David Ben Gurion’s “doctrine of the periphery.” This strategy sought to have close relations with non-Arab Muslim countries, such as Iran and Türkiye, as the Palestinian cause was perceived to be a pan-Arab cause at the time rather than a pan-Islamic one. Additionally, given the Cold War context, Ankara and Tel Aviv found themselves cooperating further due to the shared threat of Soviet-backed Ba’athist regimes in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq. More broadly, the Kemalist ideological worldview dominated Türkiye during this period. Thus, seeing themselves as a “Western” and “European” country, the leadership of Türkiye focused on pursuing close ties with the Western bloc, while distancing themselves from the Middle East and the Islamic World.

Relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv tightened during the 1970s, primarily due to Turkish energy relations with the Arab countries and the Turkish economic crises that made their relations with the Gulf Arab countries more critical. As a result, the Turks made several policy decisions in favour of the Palestinians. In June 1975, Türkiye officially recognized the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the representative for the Palestinians. In November 1975, Türkiye voted in favor of UN resolution 3379, which equated Zionism with racism. Lastly, in 1979, the Turkish government permitted the opening of a PLO office in Ankara. Importantly, in 1980, after the Israeli government recognized Jerusalem as its capital under the Jerusalem Act, Ankara downgraded its diplomatic relations with Israel.

The next stage of Israeli-Turkish relations was during the 1990s-2008, known as the ‘Golden Period.’ In 1991, Ankara restored full diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv in December 1991. Significantly, from Türkiye’s perspective, improving relations with Israel would counter the lobbying attempts to recognize the Armenian Genocide. In some respects, this effort bore fruit as many Jewish-American organizations lobbied Congress not to recognize the Armenian Genocide. In fact, even today, the Israelis do not recognize the Armenian Genocide, viewing that recognition would damage their relations with the Turks – and, by extension, with the Azeris since Baku has been a strategic partner for Tel Aviv to counter Iranian influence. The most the Israelis have done is to characterize the Armenian Genocide as a “tragedy.”

Ever since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, the foreign policy doctrine of ‘neo-Ottomanism’ has risen to predominance. While this doctrine does not advocate imposing an Islamic system in Türkiye, it advocates building on the Ottoman heritage for domestic and foreign policies, such as the openness for multiculturalism, in contrast to the Kemalist vision of a homogenous Turkish identity, and building on the country’s legacy in the Middle East.

As it relates to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for the AKP government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan more specifically, the Palestinian cause was an opportunity to raise Ankara’s stature as the leader of the Muslim World and compete with the Saudis (and the Iranians to a lesser extent). Thus, relations between the Israelis and Turks deteriorated as the Turks were more publicly critical of Israel and started improving relations with Hamas.

In 2006, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal visited Ankara at the request of the Turkish government. In 2009, during the Davos World Economic Forum, Erdoğan abruptly left a meeting with the Israeli prime minister, Shimon Peres.  Later, in 2010, IDF soldiers killed nine Turkish citizens who participated in the Gaza Freedom Flotilla. The flotilla was a group of six ships that sought to end Israel’s blockade of Gaza. In response, the Turkish government downgraded its relations with Israel and expelled the Israeli ambassador due to Israel’s refusal to apologize for the flotilla incident. Furthermore, Erdoğan allegedly told the Iranians the identities of 10 spies who worked for Israel.

Eventually, the two countries reached a deal to normalize relations in 2016, yet tensions persisted. In 2018, the Turks once again downgraded ties with Israel and expelled the ambassador due to the IDF killing 60 Palestinians who protested Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. Erdoğan also tweeted that “Hamas is not a terrorist organization” but a “resistance movement” that is defending Palestinian land against an ”occupying power.” However, in 2022, the two countries announced that they would restore full diplomatic relations.

In the aftermath of Hamas’ terrorist attack on Israel on October 7, the Turkish government condemned the loss of civilian life on Israeli territory. However, ever since Israel’s military campaign in Gaza started, the Turkish government became one of the most ardent critics of Israel, especially Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Notably, on October 25, 2023, Erdoğan reiterated that Hamas is not a “terrorist organization” but a “liberation group.”  During a rally in the same month, Erdoğan accused the Israelis of being “war criminals” and criticized the West for tolerating Israel’s massacring of Palestinian civilians. In November 2023, Ankara – along with Amman and Manama – recalled its ambassador to Israel due to the rising humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza.

In May 2024, the Turks ended their trade relations with Israel due to the worsening humanitarian situation in Gaza. Notably, in July 2024, Erdoğan threatened to send Turkish troops into Gaza to protect the lives of Palestinian civilians. Recently, in August 2024, Türkiye officially joined South Africa’s case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing Israel of committing genocide in Gaza. Also, after the Israelis allegedly assassinated/killed Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas Political Bureau Chief, Erdoğan, condemned it. On X, Erdogan posted, “I strongly condemn and curse the treacherous assassination carried out in Tehran against Hamas Political Bureau Chief Ismail Haniyeh,” it was “a despicable attempt to undermine the Palestinian Cause, the glorious resistance of Gaza, and the rightful struggle of our Palestinian brothers, aiming to demoralize, intimidate, and suppress them.” During the UNGA in September 2024, Erdoğan said that the UN should recommend the use of force to stop the ongoing killings in Gaza.

On the one hand, the growing criticism of Israel is in part due to domestic public pressure. Given Erdoğan’s dwindling popularity – in large part over the mismanagement of the Turkish economy – support for the Palestinians has been a tactic to regain public support. The New Welfare Party, a political party to the right of the AKP, accused the Turkish government of not doing enough to pressure Israel. Even the CHP, the Kemalist party that has traditionally favoured close relations with Israel, has had to assuage public support for the Palestinians. For example, Ozgur Ozel, the leader of the CHP Party, said during a political rally, “I have not called Hamas a terrorist organization, but I have condemned its terrorist attacks… I also condemned Israel’s state terrorism.” Notably, Ozel said, “Erdogan. If you are on Palestine’s side, stop the trade that your relatives, children, supporters, and friends do with Israel every day.” The CHP’s reactions illustrate how the support for the Palestinians transcends the “secular-Islamist” division in Türkiye.

However, at the same time, the Turkish government has avoided crossing any “red lines” that would damage its relations with the Americans. After all, Türkiye is a member of NATO, and the relationship between Türkiye and the U.S. is too important for either party to discard entirely. Moreover, Ankara’s minimal criticism of Israel’s killing of Hassan Nasrallah indicates how the weakening of Hezbollah, and by extension Iran, is indicative of the complex geopolitical nature of the region, because the weakening of Hezbollah – and by extension, Iran – is something the Turks welcome.

As the war in Gaza is ongoing and the situation in Lebanon is escalating, it is crucial to keep in mind that the various geopolitical factors that cause countries like Türkiye to get involved do not necessarily match the desires and aspirations of Israelis and Palestinians alike.