The Stubborn Path To Water War

The Brahmaputra River, one of the largest in the world, flows over 2000 miles from the highlands of Tibet through northern India to the Bay of Bengal. It crosses three international borders and is the backbone of life for over 1.3 billion people according to Christopher’s 2013 report ‘Water Wars’. After leaving its glacial highland origins in Tibet the water snakes towards India before making a significant U-bend known as the ‘Great Bend’. Here, the river drops thousands of feet in elevation. It is one of the most dramatic vertical river decreases in the world and massive amounts of water are channeled through a narrow space deeper than the Grand Canyon. The hydroelectric potential of this water here for China’s energy development goals is tenfold. The river then re-routes course for India, where it is the country’s pillar for agricultural security and production.

 
On September 30th, China announced the construction of two additional hydroelectric dams on a Tibetan portion of the Brahmaputra, increasing fear and tension for the lower riparian states of India and Bangladesh. Five years ago, China had 23 000 dams under construction nationwide, with 13 specifically situated on the Brahmaputra. The surge in dam building is aimed at achieving China’s Five Year Energy plan to re-route 45 billion cubic liters of water northwards each year by 2050. China suffers from an imbalance between its water supply and water demand, with its industrially dominant regions in the north of the country while its freshwater reserves are in the south. India and Bangladesh however, suffer even greater geographical misfortune, receiving the waters of the Brahmaputra after China. Despite assurances by the Chinese authorities that these projects will be ‘run of the river’ (i.e. the dams will have no bearing on downstream water flow), India and Bangladesh are growing increasingly concerned as China now has the ability to severely influence the flow of water in their northern regions, disrupting both agriculture and the livelihoods of millions.

 
For India, its quest for state security and water stability is heavily reliant on the Brahmaputra. India’s move for hydroelectric possibilities are not as advanced as China’s, yet India’s concerns over the river are deeply rooted in agricultural importance. Comprising of 18% of India’s GDP, agriculture is a hugely significant source of state stability and growth. The effects of large-scale Chinese dam-building upstream are numerous and multifaceted in nature. In ‘Water Wars,’ Christopher claimed that consequences include, but are not limited to, the “disruption of natural flooding cycles; the holding back of nutrient-rich sediment; and changes to riparian, marine, and fishery ecology and economy.” There is also a clear link between water scarcity and food security, as the ability for China to control and cut off India’s water also gives it power over its food supply. Projections from a 2009 McKinsey report found that by 2030 India will face a 50% gap between its water (and therefore agricultural) needs and the availability of renewable and sustainable fresh water reserves- double that of China’s 25% gap. India’s necessity for the water of the Brahmaputra far exceeds China’s, and the gap between necessity and availability is far greater with much higher consequences.

 
China’s energy development policy is compounding exponentially. India’s and Bangladesh’s concerns are valid and it has been theorized recently that the two’s hands may be forced to conflict in the very near future should a compromise not be achieved with China. China is in a comfortable position, while lower riparian states are growing increasingly dependent on fluctuations in Chinese policy with less and less autonomy over the waters within their own borders. India in particular, in part due to its economic power and volatile history with China, is the main concern here, with little options available to de-securitize the issue and ensure a peaceful resolution for all parties.

 
Currently, there are no multilateral mechanisms or bilateral treaties to deal with this trans-boundary river dispute and no international laws to govern its use. The authoritative attitude of Chinese dam-building and its almost complete ability to control the Brahmaputra is in part India’s own fault. India has shown a strong precedent for entering into water sharing arrangements with its closest neighbors, even with states where a strong historical rivalry exists. Yet India has remained stubborn in its attitude towards bilateral negotiation with the Chinese and its inability to reach a deal thus far results in the position they face now. According to Subedi, in their article on South Asia Hydro-Diplomacy, India managed to secure a binding water sharing agreement with downstream Pakistan (a long time rival) under the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960. Similarly, in 1996 India entered into the Ganges River Treaty with Bangladesh, which involved almost equal sharing of the Ganges River and minimum allowances for cross-border water flows. India’s openness towards downstream local states theoretically can and should be extended to upstream states. China has also demonstrated the ability to compromise on water sharing, including bilateral deals with Russian and Kazakhstan. Despite this, across the border, China has been defiant in its national approaches to water cooperation with India. In 1997 it voted against the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UNWC), which aimed to strike a balance between upstream and downstream interests. Both India and China have intentionally shown strong opposition to pursue any meaningful cooperation over the Brahmaputra.

 
There is a necessity for action now rather than later, as India’s situation worsens and both China and India’s aims and incentives are being pulled further apart. Several Memorandums of Understanding between India and China have been signed in the recent decade to improve communication between both states regarding hydro-logical information. These MOUs are merely cordial in nature however and involve information sharing rather than securing any binding obligations between one another. Additionally, what is debated and agreed on at an international level differs significantly at a local level. The Arunachal Pradesh region in South Tibet and northern India has been in dispute for over half a century and has been the flash-point for border skirmishes ever since. Locally, Arunachal Pradesh has experienced the worst effects of China’s dam-building thus far, with rivers running dry in many villages on the Indian side of the border, most notably in February 2012. Additionally, there are masses of Chinese and India troops on either side of this Himalayan region, and local government sentiments are much less accommodating of a passive response to China’s aggressive dam-building. The Brahmaputra case now gives an already very hostile region an elevated and new found importance within the security policies of both states, greatly increasing possibilities for conflict in the region over the cross-border river.

 
There is a high likelihood that the potential for conflict at the local level may dangerously overlap to the regional and international levels of all state’s foreign and security policies. There needs to be a substantial re-think of both state’s energy development policies and India must submit its hesitation to negotiate and promptly begin discussions on legally binding arrangements. Conflict between both China and India, the region’s two economic powerhouses, would be disastrous for both themselves and surrounding smaller nations. As of now, China’s trans-boundary river management is a subset of its border relations policy, with no independent mechanism for governance and management even at a domestic level. Before substantial bilateral progression can be made, China needs to solidify its position on trans-boundary rivers, shifting the authority and responsibility to the national level in line with those who have the power to legislate bilaterally. Only then will this type of governance be possible and practical.

 
There exists a clear tension between India and China over the Brahmaputra River, with divergent objectives strained in opposing directions. Both India and China have equally pressing aims with agriculture and hydroelectricity their most significant respective ambitions. Both nationally backed mechanisms for sustaining state development and regional power, these objectives are heavily reliant on water availability from the Brahmaputra. Efforts to increase dialogue and reignite possibilities for bilateral governance over the water way is of primary importance here. There also needs to be a consolidation at the national level, both in India and China, of their positions on the issue and ensure that these are mirrored at the local level where conflict would be the most likely.

China’s antagonistic policies towards dam building and resource diversion reflect a zero-sum mentality, and should India proactively seek cooperative mechanisms in the present as its options will be severely limited in the future. Peace is still possible, yet the window is closing fast should China’s hyper-intensive dam-building projects continue at their rate as planned.

John McMahon

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