Following decades of governance by a vicious anti-communist military dictatorship, in 1985, Guatemala established a representative democracy. Despite the regime change, the country has continued to experience many social and political challenges, including corruption, high crime rates, and poverty. To fully understand the reasons for these issues, as well as the persistent barriers to democratic consolidation in Guatemala, it is necessary to analyze the long-term effects of U.S. foreign policy in the region, specifically the role of the 1954 CIA coup and the subsequent Guatemalan Civil War. Examining the history between the U.S. and Guatemala reveals that foreign companies and intervention weakened Guatemala’s institutional powers and inhibited efforts to bring about true democratic stability, which has left negative implications for the economic and social viability of indigenous Guatemalan communities today.

The hardships currently plaguing modern Guatemala have entrenched roots in past U.S. foreign policy decisions. Many Latin American governments, in the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries, were led by military dictators who established economic policies that facilitated and encouraged liberal foreign investments, especially from wealthy countries such as the U.S. An example of a successful American-owned company that greatly benefitted from investments in Latin America, most prominently in Guatemala, was the United Fruit Company (UFCO), which mainly traded bananas. The UFCO quickly became a dominant and overwhelming force in the region, owning hundreds of thousands of acres of Guatemalan land. This land was not only used for banana plantations but also railways, telephone lines, post offices, and telegram services, all of which were used to ensure the maintenance of U.S. market control in the region. The pervasiveness of U.S. influence in the country rendered the UFCO a state within a state, where foreign interests reaped massive profits without making any meaningful contributions to the nation’s well-being. As a result, Guatemala became known by the derogatory term, “Banana Republic,” which was used to refer to poor and developing countries ruled by corrupt governments that relied heavily on the export of bananas

During 1945 and 1954, however, the UFCO experienced government opposition for the first time. Opposition arose when pro-democracy forces overthrew the dictator supported by the UFCO, Jorge Ubico, replacing him with Juan Jose Arévalo, a reformist who initiated moderate agrarian reforms aimed at restraining U.S. companies and bolstering the domestic economy along with other social initiatives in education, health, and infrastructure. Given the subservience of Arévalo’s predecessors, the U.S. was not supportive of Arévalo’s administration, leading the U.S.-backed army to attempt about thirty coups during his six years in office. Following his presidency, democratically elected Jacobo Arbenz continued Arévalo’s reforms on a larger scale through the implementation of social programs that prioritized income distribution and economic nationalism, with land reform being one of his primary goals. Arbenz viewed Guatemala’s unequal land distribution as the main impediment to economic development and strived to transfer this property to landless peasants to fuel domestic industries, and in turn, reduce the reliance on foreign corporations such as UFCO.

As tensions between Arbenz and the U.S. government grew stronger, the Eisenhower administration labeled him a communist and vied for his removal. To convince the American public, elites in Guatemala that supported the UFCO persuaded U.S. journalists and members of Congress to believe that the Guatemalan government was moving closer toward communism. In light of the Cold War, the belief that Guatemala had ties to the Soviet Union prompted the U.S. to utilize the newly created CIA to launch a concealed operation to overthrow him in 1954, also known as Operation Success. In doing so, the CIA began recruiting opposition forces in Guatemala to stage a coup and engaged in psychological warfare by promoting anti-Arbenz journalists, blocking government radio frequencies, and dropping leaflets containing false information about Arbenz. These efforts were designed to disguise the coup as a spontaneous popular uprising and mitigate suspicions of U.S. involvement. As a consequence of the coup, the CIA successfully dismantled democracy and helped bring military dictator Castillo Armas into power. In the meantime, the U.S. continued to assist Guatemala’s anti-communist leaders for the remainder of the Cold War.

With the removal of Arbenz, divisions between the U.S.-sponsored government and left-wing guerilla groups increasingly heightened. The civil war officially commenced when a group of armed insurgents conducted an unsuccessful uprising against military dictator, Ydígoras Fuentes, in an attempt to address land rights, economic marginalization, and human rights abuses. Although the attempt failed, it helped give rise to a loosely coordinated left-wing guerrilla movement that brought together rebel military officers, the Guatemalan Workers Party, and backing from student, worker, and peasant groups. Soon after this uprising, the war quickly intensified with the implementation of a counterinsurgency campaign, characterized by tactics such as arbitrary arrests, torture techniques, and paramilitary death squads as a way to suppress political opposition. Notably, these policies greatly targeted civilians, particularly Mayan communities, who were believed to be providing support to the guerilla movement. After 36 years of war and the subsequent deaths of 200,000 Guatemalans, largely propelled by U.S. funds, the Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala concluded that the military was guilty of genocide.

The long-term effects of U.S. foreign policy in Guatemala are not only evident in the catastrophic loss of lives due to the genocide but also in the production of weak institutions and lack of democratic stability currently affecting the country. For example, although Guatemala has held regular elections since the 1980s, organized crime and corruption have immensely impacted the functioning of the government. These issues have been difficult to address because the rule of law is overpowered by the influence of outside actors who tend to prioritize their own interests over the genuine pursuit of justice.

These conditions are partially tied to past U.S. foreign policy that instituted a militarized political culture through their support of authoritarian regimes and draconian counterinsurgency measures, which resulted in the erosion of trust in government, especially among Mayan communities. Furthermore, during this time, the U.S. often ignored the constant human rights abuses committed by the regimes they supported, producing an ineffective judicial system manipulated by powerful elites and foreign corporations. This sentiment has been expressed by René De León Schlotter, a member of Guatemala’s center-left Democrats, who stated, “The responsibility of the United States, although indirect, is very real and serious. With its policy of supporting dictatorships, the United States has collaborated in the strengthening of these regimes and burdened our people with debts, often for the most superfluous programs.”

In terms of Guatemala’s socioeconomic status, similar dynamics continue to hold true: the Mayan population is still disproportionately affected by poverty, discrimination, and economic inequalities. For instance, long-held grievances by the indigenous community including the failure to redistribute land, unfair wages, and dangerous working conditions have yet to be addressed. Considering that less than 1% of landowner corporations control 75% of the most fertile land in the country, Indigenous people are left with few job options, forcing them to seek work elsewhere, either through internal or external migration according to Minority Rights Group. Due to ineffective judicial institutions and self-interested leaders, the effects of the civil war remain unaddressed for many indigenous Guatemalans.

These social and economic conditions have affected how Mayans view and treat their country. This is important to note because citizens’ attitudes contribute a great deal in shaping the quality of the state, usually, more so than the rulers. A state’s legitimacy increases as its citizens view it as rightfully possessing and exercising political authority. Thus, nations with security, order, freedom, and general welfare tend to lead to more legitimate nations. Additionally, political determinants, such as corruption control and political stability can directly lead to more government support. In sum, legitimacy is based on how well a state equally fulfills its obligations to its people.

The case of Guatemala demonstrates how the repressive legacies of U.S. foreign policy have lived on to exacerbate instability and socioeconomic hardship in other countries, resulting in a weak state and entrenched levels of distrust in institutions, especially for indigenous communities. Although Guatemala faces a long path toward the attainment of a strong democracy, the recent election of Bernardo Arévalo and his advocacy for policies aimed at combatting corruption, poverty, and crime presents a crucial opportunity to interrupt the longstanding injustices the country has endured. To achieve meaningful social, political, and economic reforms it will be imperative that Arévalo prioritize the rights of indigenous communities and strengthen the legitimacy of state institutions.