The Yemeni Houthis and Al-Qaeda offshoot al-Shabaab recently increased their relationship, establishing weapons sharing, member training, and the spread of Iranian technology. According to the United Nations in 2025, their growing relationship was founded on the Houthis trading their more advanced weapons and skills for illicit routes, arms smuggling, and piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Despite being mutually beneficial, this relationship is historically unlikely. The Houthis are a Shia Islamist group, while al-Shabaab are Sunni, meaning there is a sectarian divide. Moreover, the Houthis previously fought against al-Shabaab’s Al-Qaeda ally in the Arabian Peninsula. 

Their relationship is harmful for the international community because it strengthens both groups, disseminates advanced weapons to jihadist organizations, gives the Houthis more power and resources, and spreads Iranian technology. With the U.S., Iran, and Israel currently engaged in conflict, the spread of Iranian technology and its “Axis of Resistance” can have implications on the war. According to the African Defense Forum and the Panel of Experts on Yemen, “cooperation with Al-Shabaab is not simply for transactional benefits; it is also part of a Houthi strategy to wield increasing influence in the region.” Houthi relies on Iran for military and financial aid, and Iran utilizes them for attacks on Israel. This alliance means that spreading Houthi influence can in turn spread Iranian ideals. 

Their relationship also greatly impacts trade and the economy of nations bordering the Red Sea due to increased piracy and the Houthi–al-Shabaab presence. The Houthis are currently observing a US-brokered ceasefire, and have not attacked the Red Sea in 2026. Despite this, they have been threatening to close the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. This would have harsh consequences for trade and energy. According to the International Crisis Group, on 1 April 2026, a Houthi official stated that closing the strait would “be implemented should the aggression against Iran and Lebanon escalate savagely, or if any Gulf state becomes directly involved in military operations in support of the [Zionist] entity [ie, Israel] or the U.S.” If tensions continue to escalate and the Houthis decide to close the strait, al-Shabaab may provide reinforcements, since the strait acts as a weapons smuggling route between the two groups. 

Currently, al-Shabaab and the Houthis face international sanctions as part of the policies aimed to condemn and weaken them. But, prior to the ceasefire, maritime efforts by the U.N. and E.U. were common policy decisions. With their connections to jihadi groups, there are few policy choices that do not engage in direct conflict. Although the ceasefire prevented the Houthis from attacking the Red Sea, the groups continue to engage in weapons and technology trade, smuggling, and piracy, indicating the need for stronger policies and shifts in what is implemented. Without it, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait may close, Israel and the U.S. face potential attacks, and the further advancement of both groups is greatly possible.

According to Faisal Ali from Geeska, al-Shabaab and the Houthis’ relationship started to bloom as early as 2015, when Somali traders connected to al-Shabaab created commercial trade ties to Yemeni merchants connected to the Houthis. Word of this relationship has been stirring for over ten years, yet it continues to increase, allowing both groups to advance. Moreover, the Red Sea issue occurring at the same time as the U.S./Israel–Iran conflict further complicates policy. Though the strait is being used as leverage to reduce escalation, it also puts U.S. troops and military operations in the area at higher risk due to the spread of Houthi and Iranian influence, impacting U.S.’s ability to effectively address this issue. 

Current sanctions are not effective because both groups continue to benefit from smuggling and use of illicit routes. Common sanctions on the Houthis include asset freezes, travel bans, and arms embargoes. Asset freezes and arms embargoes are not effective because of their illegal procurement, and travel bans do not hold enough weight due to loopholes and alternative modes of communication. Though policy efforts such as operations, maritime police forces, naval use, and maritime security missions are more effective than sanctions, the problem still persists. The Association of Certified Sanction Specialists reported that the Puntland Maritime Police Forces and international navies have been effective at disrupting some piracy. More specifically, according to the International Union of Maritime Insurance, E.U. Operation Aspides has upped maritime ship traffic and created a stable increase of the number of ships using the Red Sea passage. 

Though the ceasefire’s success at preventing attacks is a notable achievement, policies fail to halt or focus on the decade-long budding relationship between the Houthis and al-Shabaab. So far, policies towards al-Shabaab and the Houthis have been individually targeted, and policies towards one group have not affected the other. This is the core issue present, because there are too many implications for the international community to evade addressing this relationship as a whole. Additionally, there is partial policy and operation failure within the E.U.’s Operation Aspides and international navies. Although the operation has increased ship traffic in the Red Sea and international navies have disrupted piracy, the two groups still operate their smuggling and illicit trade routes through the strait and the Gulf of Aden. Their collaboration has not been stopped. 

Eroding the relationship and halting the innovation of these groups needs more focused policy choices. For example, in an attempt to halt the smuggling and trade routes, international navies unengaged in conflict and with a surplus of resources should contribute more to the strait and gulf. Rather than using violence, these navies could donate more naval ships or engage in coastal monitoring. The goal would be to expand multinational maritime surveillance in an attempt to lower the success rate of overseas smuggling. With more resources in the sea, it would allow for the increased monitoring and stopping of ships for inspections or questioning, which lowers smuggling success. This multinational effort could be coordinated either by the U.N. through Security Council mandates or maritime security authorizations, allowing intelligence sharing between participating navies, or through the Combined Maritime Forces, as they are already active in the region.  

Overall, the greatest outcomes of the slowly forming relationship between the Houthis and al-Shabaab are their abilities to work around obstacles and their potential for advancement. Implications in the Red Sea, Israel, and in U.S. attacks have already been seen, and would worsen if the Houthis are able to fully spread their influence into al-Shabaab. Weakening their relationship and targeting policies towards both groups must be implemented in order to halt their spreading influence, ideals, and advancement.