In The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, Michel Foucault asserts: “Where there is power, there is resistance.” This crucial observation highlights a continuous clash between two opposing forces: power, which seeks to dominate and expand its reach, and resistance, which strives to reject this dominance through various mechanisms; whether violent, such as armed conflicts, or peaceful, exemplified by movements like Gandhi’s Salt March. But the objective of this article is to challenge the nature of war between these two factions and the subsequent peace that is established.

This article concerns the dichotomy of war and peace between resistance and hegemonic forces. Even though war and peace may occur among nations other than superpowers, this article concerns the interaction of resistance and dominant forces. This issue was most apparent during the Vietnam War, when a much weaker resistance fought against a far more powerful occupier, as opposed to World War II, when this war mainly involved a confrontation between major superpowers. The primary question of this paper is: do weak resistance movements decide peace terms, or is peace shaped and imposed by the superior victorious power?

To examine this, one must consider the tools used in building post-war peace, such as negotiations, ceasefires, and diplomacy. These tools ultimately decide the character of post-war peace. A case in point is the Dayton Accords, which culminated in the “General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina” and brought an end to the war that wrought a massive degree of destruction for almost four years. It was only one of a number of wars waged in the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

The Dayton Accords reference the United Nations Charter, with several articles outlining the recognition of peoples’ languages, election administration, human rights protection, and rights for refugees. The articles also include principles of mutual recognition among the warring parties. For instance, recognition between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Croatia is sometimes considered a compromise, particularly because immense human rights violations took place. Nevertheless, this recognition is a prime consideration in post-war relations, as envisioned by the 1995 Dayton Accords, which established the parameters of these relations.

According to a document published online by the BBC, the Paris Peace Accords, signed between the United States and Vietnamese resistance groups in early 1973, provide another example. In his article “We Don’t Want a Munich: Hanoi’s Diplomatic Strategy, 1965-1968,” historian Pierre Asselin identifies three “modes of struggle” that required distinct strategies. The political battle was the first, where large numbers of individuals in Southern Vietnam were mobilised and joined resistance groups. The military battle was the second and encompassed battlefield strategies, which were critical in winning the war as a whole. The third was the “diplomatic struggle,” where efforts at securing the sympathy of the Chinese, Soviets, and other Communists or socialist states were made.

The Paris Peace Accords are different from the Dayton Accords due to the character of the conflicts, the parties involved, and the conditions surrounding each conflict. Notably, both cases reveal provisions that defined the post-war years. In the Paris Peace Accords, for instance, Article I states that “the United States and all other nations respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam as stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet-Nam.” The other articles discuss the disarmament of military bases in Southern Vietnam and the release of POWs (prisoners-of-war), which confirmed the North Vietnamese resistance movement’s absolute victory.

In contrast, the Dayton Accords resulted in what some describe as an “unfinished state,” as argued by Slobodan Petrović in his article “The Political System of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Fault Lines Set Down in the Dayton Agreement.” Petrović also emphasises the importance of “local self-government,” among other shortcomings. These shortcomings concerned the status of Muslim Bosnians, who were considered to be the main victims of the war.

The following question is vital: does this comparison demonstrate that how wars are conducted and how wars end shape post-war peace? The answer would appear to be yes. More importantly, however, it is necessary to recognise that all peace accords, including, for example, the Oslo Accords between Fatah and Israel, must incorporate transitional justice, international observation, and the greater inclusion of marginalised voices and vulnerable parties to prevent further post-war oppression against them.

It is the duty of resistance movements to envision and create a political philosophy that suits the post-war era, either during the war itself or during the negotiation process. A top-down peace agreement can further the interests and priorities of the victor, who can be, as is often the case, the aggressor. And it is strange that sometimes the weaker party is blamed for not resisting enough; for example, many people sometimes ask why didn’t the Palestinians continue to fight until the end!