Alexei Navalny, who, according to the Russian penitentiary service, passed away on February 16th in a high-security prison in northern Russia, was the foremost opponent of the authoritarian Russian President Vladimir Putin. At the age of 47, Navalny had been a prominent figure in the democracy movement in Russia for about 15 years, posing the primary internal threat to Putin’s power.
Through his foundation, the Anti-Corruption Foundation, and a political strategy centered around exposing corruption and misconduct within the Russian political elite, Navalny had become a popular political figure. However, he and his organization faced brutal repression: Navalny was prevented multiple times from running in elections, the Anti-Corruption Foundation was declared illegal, and he, along with his associates, was subjected to judicial proceedings widely seen as politically motivated. Over the years, Navalny had also survived multiple attempts on his life, including a severe poisoning for which Russian security services were accused.
Navalny had been held in harsh conditions in Russia for three years, with his collaborators reporting systematic negligence regarding the medical care he should have received for his fragile health. He was serving multiple sentences totaling decades in prison, all on charges deemed politically motivated and pursued by Vladimir Putin’s regime to suppress his political activity. In late December, he was transferred to the maximum-security prison IK-3, located above the Arctic Circle, over 1,900 kilometers from Moscow. Known for its brutal conditions, the IK-3 prison, a former Soviet-era gulag, is situated in the autonomous region of Yamalo-Nenets.
After years of brutal repression, the opposition to Vladimir Putin’s regime is currently devoid of charismatic leaders and a coherent political vision, and it does not appear to have the strength to act in a politically impactful manner. This does not imply that there is no discontent towards Putin in Russia or that his power is unchallenged. Opposition movements, more or less clandestine organizations, and courageous individuals who bravely confront repression still exist in the country. However, in today’s Russia, opposition organizations are under attack and isolated, primarily focused on “survival,” as stated by Giulia De Florio, a Russian language researcher at the University of Parma and a member of the board of Memorial Italia.
Currently, all nationally known opposition leaders in Russia are either in prison, in exile abroad, or have died or been killed.
Among the opposition leaders in prison are figures like Vladimir Kara-Murza, a journalist and activist who, among other roles, served as the vice president of Open Russia and was one of the prominent figures in the democratic movement. Ilya Yashin, another government opponent, is also incarcerated. Both Kara-Murza and Yashin were allies of Alexei Navalny and were considered key representatives of a new generation of opposition politicians, emerging from the 2011-2012 protests against electoral fraud during legislative and presidential elections in those years.
In addition to those imprisoned, exiled, killed, or deceased, the opposition in Russia lacks any other nationally recognized leaders. Even organizations that once actively opposed the regime, such as the Anti-Corruption Foundation founded by Navalny or those dedicated to human rights defense, like Memorial, have been compelled to shut down or relocate abroad.
Most notably, and perhaps even more worrisome, what remains of the opposition in Russia currently lacks the strength and perhaps even the ability to offer a more comprehensive perspective, which is what politics requires. According to Giulia De Florio: “The only ones with a real political program were Navalny, Kara-Murza, and Ilya Yashin.”
Discontent towards Putin undoubtedly persists. This was evident on the evening of Navalny’s death, Friday, when hundreds of people protested in major Russian cities against the regime. However, Russian security forces’ repression has become overwhelming. Protests for Navalny were swiftly dispersed, and over 100 individuals were arrested.
Additionally, there is a significant number of political prisoners — individuals actively pursued and deprived of freedom by the regime because they are deemed a political threat. These include journalists, politicians, activists, and scholars who, according to the Memorial association, are currently over 600 political prisoners in Russia.
The war in Ukraine has further polarized Russian society, leveraging nationalism and a sense of isolation. The elimination of all independent media (the last ones, such as Meduza or Novaya Gazeta, have been closed or forced to relocate abroad since the beginning of the war) and increasingly pervasive propaganda have eradicated all dissenting voices. This has contributed to making Putin the sole perceived alternative in the eyes of many Russians. According to reliable polling firms, Putin’s popularity has soared above 80% since the invasion of Ukraine. Despite this, there is a segment of Russian society that desires to express itself but struggles to do so. This is evident, for example, in the subscriptions for the candidacy of Boris Nadezhdin, a Russian opposition politician and anti-war advocate who surprisingly sought to challenge Putin in the March presidential elections. He managed to gather the required 100,000 signatures to submit his candidacy, a challenging task given the stringent conditions imposed by Putin to hinder grassroots candidacies. Nadezhdin’s candidacy was considered a strong sign of dissent, but the Russian electoral commission invalidated it.
Excluded from electoral politics, the opposition in Russia now often operates clandestinely and is engaged in very concrete tasks, such as helping people leave the country to avoid conscription, finding spaces to evade censorship: all survival practices. Some associations and individuals continue to operate within the country, facing significant risks, including independent journalists collaborating with foreign outlets, lawyers defending imprisoned opponents, and human rights activists.
Part of the dissent has coalesced around anti-war movements. A recent example is “Way Home”, an association of wives and mothers of over 300,000 reservists sent to fight in Ukraine. The women of “Way Home” call for an end to the war and the return of soldiers, organizing cautious protests and gaining some following. There is also opposition organized abroad, consisting of the hundreds of thousands of Russians who have fled the country in recent years. Independent newspapers, associations, and NGOs have relocated outside Russia, and new ones have been established. Some of these associations are particularly noteworthy, such as the FAS, the Feminist Anti – War Resistance, a movement partly situated abroad and partly in clandestinity in Russia, aiming to combat the violence of Putin’s regime both inside and outside the country. However, opposition abroad is also fragmented and not cohesive.
The main challenge today in the Russian opposition seems to be the lack of a vision for the future. Twenty years of propaganda and suffocating repression, both inside and outside the country, have created conditions that make it difficult to envision a coherent opposition capable of seriously challenging Vladimir Putin’s regime. The opposition is divided, dissent is largely dissipated, and Putin has been brutal and effective in suppressing all political figures who could have united opposition against the regime. The last of them, arguably, was Alexei Navalny.
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