This week, a fuel truck explosion in the Haitian city of Cap-Haitien killed at least 75 people, another tragedy in a long, terrible year for the Caribbean island nation.

In July, amid a brewing constitutional crisis, Haitian President Jovenel Moise was assassinated in his home in an incident that remains unsolved. The following month, a 7.2 magnitude earthquake struck the country’s southern peninsula about 93 miles from the capital of Port-au-Prince. It is the deadliest natural disaster this year, with the United Nations Reliefweb estimating 2,240 deaths with 800,000 people affected, in a country which is still partially recovering from the devastating 2010 earthquake that killed over 100,000. In the wake of these events, powerful gangs are challenging Haiti’s government for control of the country with abductions, murders, and even control food and aid exacerbating suffering. All of this is occurring in a country where only .58% of the population is fully vaccinated against COVID-19, according to the CDC.

Few, if any states, could withstand the strain Haiti has endured, and aid is badly needed. However, the line between goodwill and paternalistic interference is thin, while the difference in consequence can be immense. International aid needs to be more than just well-intentioned. It needs to be deliberate and considerate of what Haitians actually want. Past aid missions have had successes, but also yielded lessons international providers haven’t learned. At times, international aid has exacerbated or created new problems in Haiti. The support of the international community can be immense and pivotal for dealing with crises. But if thought isn’t taken as to what kind of support is being sent to Haiti, and the voices of Haitians are ignored, Haiti’s suffering will only continue.

An important note to acknowledge is that aid is not always apolitical. Though NGOs, charities, and other nonprofit groups provide aid, a substantial amount comes from governments or organizations with strong ties to certain governments. The deterioration of the Haitian state was not caused by foreign governments, but the systems of aid they set up encouraged and exacerbated this collapse. When aid arrives from overseas, it often follows existing or easily found path, which includes corrupt politicians or de facto leaders with no democratic mandate. This support, both political and material, gives internationally chosen politicians, and the foreign groups that chose them, an exorbitant amount of power in Haiti.

As a direct result, this interplay of foreign support to existing elites has paved the way for much of the recent political instability in Haiti, especially in the interference of a group of international ambassadors and officials known as the “Core Group.” Even before he was assassinated, a crisis was brewing around President Moise’s electoral mandate and a dispute over when his term ended, but his regime was kept in power by foreign support. Haitian journalist and activist Monique Clesca describes how despite “[M]oise never organiz[ing] one election in nearly five years,” and how he was “becoming a dictator,” the “Core Group supported him.”

Additionally, after Moise’s assassination, the foreign powers of the Core Group again threw their weight around in determining who would take power after him. The CBC notes how with “a two-paragraph statement” and a tweet, the Core Group sidelined Claude Joseph, a Haitian politician they had originally supported, and replaced him with Ariel Henry, the current Prime Minister, asking him to form a government, despite never being elected. In his September letter of resignation over immigration policy, U.S. special envoy to Haiti Daniel Foote condemned the decision, decrying “the hubris that makes us believe we should pick the winner — again — is impressive.” Foote also said that “this cycle of international political interventions in Haiti has consistently produced catastrophic results.”

The political instability caused by unpopular and unelected politicians has encouraged and exacerbated corruption and gang violence. Writing for The New York Times, regarding Haiti’s explosion of gang activities this year, Paul Angelo writes how following increasing dissatisfaction with his reign, Moise turned to using gangs and paramilitaries to repress dissent. Moise ceded government authority to them and encouraged abuses of power. As the political crisis deepened after Moise’s death, gangs got out of the governments control, with some, like the infamous G9 gang and its alleged Moise-tied leader Jimmy Cherizier, posing as political leaders. Angelo describes how “collusion between armed groups and political elites…allowed Haiti’s gangs to supplant the state,” and achieve the current power they hold over Haiti.

Again, foreign governments didn’t directly or purposefully create these problems, but the channels of support they choose and the strings they attach to their aid, all without consulting the Haitian people, often only make the situation more unstable and more deadly. If the good intentions of the international community are to bear fruitful benefits for Haiti, the approach to international aid needs to be seriously reconsidered. More than aid, Haiti needs foreign governments and aid groups to properly understand Haiti is a sovereign state with the capacity and drive to address its own problems. As Foote noted in his resignation letter, “what our Haitian friends really want, and need, is the opportunity to chart their own course, without international puppeteering.”

To this end, international aid should be focused on a constructive dialogue with representative civil institutions in Haiti that can communicate the needs of its citizens with foreign aid providers. Here, the Commission for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis (CHSC) comes into play. In an op-ed for The New York Times, the aforementioned Haitian advocate Monique Clesca describes how in response to government crackdowns on dissent in February, “groups representing unions, professional associations, farmers’ alliances, human rights and diaspora organizations, Voodoo groups and churches formed the [CHSC].”

This organization is focused on representing its constituent groups to “reach a broad consensus” that will “create a Haitian-led solution” to Haiti’s problems. Despite being largely ignored by international governments, the CHSC have proposed a popularly backed transitional government for leading Haiti back to democracy. Their plan includes appointing officials “nominated by various sectors to legitimately represent Haitians,” including a president and representative body, whose aims would be “strengthening institutions ahead of elections” and creating an “inclusive, stable and nonviolent political system,” unencumbered by gangs and corruption. International organizations and governments need to acknowledge and encourage such grassroots, popularly supported civil organizations for aid to properly help the people of Haiti.

In an article for the Brookings Institution, Charles T. Call notes the importance and caution required for foreign aid. Call describes at length past successes of UN aid missions, specifically the 2004 U.N. mission to Haiti. Sent after a coup against President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Aristide’s rule also saw the government using gangs that became out of control. Call credits Brazilian peacekeepers who “engaged with community leaders and members on the street, and developed extensive intelligence networks” with successfully curbing gang activity. He also credits UN anti-corruption campaigns in Guatemala whose lessons may pertain to Haiti.

Later, Call cites the CHSC as an organization whose participation in the aid process is paramount, calling it an “inclusive, sustainable political dialogue,” that could “break the long pattern of exclusion and division by Haiti’s elites.” They urged that “the U.S. and other international actors should back this opportunity to construct a new political foundation.”

Call also discusses drawbacks of international aid, citing the 10,000 Haitians inadvertently killed by cholera from peacekeepers, and the unacceptable sexual abuse and exploitation of thousands of Haitians in past missions. “Contributing countries must prevent such incidents and hold accountable their soldiers and civilians,” said Charles Call. However, he concludes that if international support is done with proper consultation of local Haitian groups, aid “will have a positive and sustainable impact on Haiti’s stability and institutions.

Consulting representative organizations like the CHSC will allow foreign support to properly address actual concerns of Haitians, as well as providing strength and legitimacy to democratic institutions, rather than propping up unelected and corruption-prone elites. If more substantial aid, such as police or peacekeepers, proves necessary, these strengthened civil society organizations can gauge the form and amount of international support Haitians actually want. This will prevent overenthusiastic or clumsy aid causing more problems.

Civil institutions won’t solve all of Haiti’s problems. As Haitian-born sociologist Frederic Boisrond told the CBC, Haiti’s spiraling economy, the grip of gang violence, and politicians already in power provide major obstacles. But Boisrond acknowledges the status quo is unworkable, and told the CBC the CHSC is “the most serious attempt in years to unite Haitian society behind a demand for real political change.” Haiti has endured many eras of suffering, but now there is a chance for them to possibly find a new era. For the international community, the question isn’t simply how to help Haiti; as Clesca put it, it’s how to not be an obstacle in “letting Haitians save our own country.”