Authoritarianism has many different approaches for its direct implementation. In order to further explore and understand contemporary Authoritarianism, we must consider the practice of ‘Electoral Authoritarianism.’

Electoral authoritarianism, according to Andreas Schedler, is defined as states under the control of a dictator who has successfully ‘established the institutional facades of democracy, including regular multiparty elections for the chief executive, in order to conceal (and reproduce) harsh realities of authoritarian governance’ [1]. Few have heard of this concept, yet it is an extensive and dangerous method used to ensure the reign of authoritarian regimes and is a major threat to democratic institutions and the concept of free and fair elections. This is more commonly known as ‘vote-rigging.’ Schedler further contends that ‘[…] electoral contests are subject to state manipulation so severe, widespread, and systematic that they do not qualify as democratic’ [2]. The foundations of a democracy, such as free and fair elections, are subjected to manipulation. They are conducted to directly elect one person only – an authoritarian dictator.

Morse adds that ‘[…] incumbents hold elections that do not live up to democratic standards of freedom and fairness and, therefore, facilitate repeated incumbent victory’ [3]. Whereas, electoral authoritarianism can refer to such states that are neither not entirely free and democratic, nor containing the classic hallmarks of authoritarianism [4]. This also highlights the vexing nature of the concept of authoritarianism when applied in an academic and practical setting.

How then is electoral authoritarianism maintained? What are the key methods used in the facilitation of electoral authoritarianism?

Tlemcani asserts that, in the case of Latin-American dictators, discriminatory electoral rules are created to favour themselves and their respective political party [5].

Forero claims that “these leaders do not assassinate opposition figures or declare martial law,” rather they control the courts, and oppress free speech, association and the media [6].

Bunce and Wolchik believe that regimes can mitigate any consequences of electoral reform (although, electoral reform in an authoritarian state is not common) [7].

A “Presidential Spring” is now underway across the Middle East and parts of Africa. Sayigh states that out of the profound failure of the Arab Spring – the region now witnesses several elite players and actors using their ability to perpetuate mostly authoritarian politics [8]. Rather than taking power through a military coup d’état, these elite players use democratic electoral methods and elections to obtain power.

There are three countries that are home to rampant cases of electoral authoritarianism: Egypt, Ethiopia, and Russia. Egypt can be considered an important contemporary example of electoral authoritarianism. Evidence of manipulation of electoral laws and electoral timetables regarding the upcoming Egyptian Presidential election have recently come to light. Article 97 of the new Egyptian Constitution allows for judicial appeals regarding results. Interim President, Adly Mansour denied and voided such appeals from respective candidates [9]. Despite the hope of the Arab Spring in Egypt, electoral interference is occurring in post-Mubarak Egypt, and subsequently, Egypt has seen a decline in prospective candidates, due to the military interference [10]. Hence, we can assert that Egypt is now witnessing a new surge in electoral authoritarianism.

In Ethiopia, during the April 2008 local elections for neighbourhood and county parliaments, the governing Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) harassed and severely intimidated several democratic opposition parties [11]. Previously, the majority ruling EPRDF had campaigned unchallenged by any opposition [11]. When such opposition parties did run, they were forced to withdraw because of intimidation and harassment by the EPRDF.

In addition, cases of electoral authoritarianism can further be exemplified in Russia. During successive regional assembly elections between 2003 and 2009, Russian ‘[…] state officials often engaged in electoral manipulation and fraud with the tacit support of federal and regional administrations’[12]. Here, electoral authoritarianism is prevalent in supporting the rule of President Vladimir Putin. The fate of elections is decided by the Kremlin, and not by the average Russian electorate.

Local and regional elections in Ethiopia and Russia highlight the prevalence of electoral authoritarianism in the modern-era. Similarly, in Latin America, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua are also major examples of dictators who secured their power via electoral authoritarianism, along with further attempts to disguise such corruption under the pretext of an election [13].

Electoral authoritarianism can be mitigated and removed by ensuring ‘[…] a level-playing field for the opposition, counting votes correctly, and always abiding by the result of the popular vote’ [14]. Electoral authoritarianism stands as a major threat to peace, democracy, and the rule of law. It also gravely threatens the right of ordinary individuals within states to cast their preferred vote.

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[1]. Schedler, A 2006, ‘The logic of electoral authoritarianism’, in A Schedler (eds), Electoral authoritarianism: the dynamics of unfree competition, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, pp. 1-23.

[2]. Ibid, p.4.

[3]. Morse, Y 2012, ‘The era of electoral authoritarianism’, World Politics, vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 161-198.

[4]. Bogaards, M 2008, ‘How to classify hybrid regimes? Defective democracy and electoral authoritarianism’, Democratization, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 399-423.

[5]. Tlemcani, R 2007, ‘Electoral authoritarianism’, Carneign Endowment for International Peace, viewed 3 April 2012, <//carnegieendowment.org/2007/05/29/electoral-authoritarianism/25wc>.

[6]. Forero, J 2012, ‘Latin America’s new authoritarians’, Washington Post, viewed 3 April 2014, <//www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/2012/07/22/gJQAMdtD3W_story.html?wpisrc=emailtoafriend>.

[7]. Bunce, V & Wolchik, S 2010, ‘Defeating dictators: electoral change and stability in competitive authoritarian regimes’, World Politics, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 43-86.

[8]. Sayigh, Y 2014, ‘From Arab spring to presidential spring’, Carnegie Middle East Centre, viewed 4 April 2014, <//carnegie-mec.org/2014/04/03/from-arab-spring-to-presidential-spring/h6wm>.

[9]. Ibid, p.1.

[10]. Al Jazeera, 2014, Egypt’s election lacks candidates, Al Jazeera Online, viewed 4 April 2014, < //www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/03/egypt-election-lacks-candidates-20143278132166580.html>.

[11]. Aalen, L & Tronvoll, K 2008, ‘The 2008 Ethiopian local elections: the return of electoral authoritarianism’, African Affairs, vol. 108, no. 430, pp. 111-120.

[12]. Ross, C 2011, ‘Regional elections and electoral authoritarianism in Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 63, no. 4, pp. 641-661.

[13]. Forero, J 2012, ‘Latin America’s new authoritarians’, Washington Post, viewed 3 April 2014, <//www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/2012/07/22/gJQAMdtD3W_story.html?wpisrc=emailtoafriend>.

[14]. Kinne, B & Marinov, N 2012, ‘Electoral authoritarianism and credible signaling in international crises’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 57, no. 3, pp. 359-386.