As 2025 unfolds, Egypt’s leaders are eagerly preparing for a landmark state visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping—a visit that reflects the significant progress in Cairo–Beijing ties. Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly recently called Xi’s forthcoming trip “a pivotal moment” to advance cooperation, noting that today’s global and regional challenges demand closer collaboration between Egypt and China. Indeed, analysts observe that “China’s influence among developing countries is soaring, with Egypt becoming a key political and commercial partner in North Africa.” The two governments have spent the past decade deepening what they call a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” tying Cairo’s Vision 2030 economic plans to Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. Since formalizing ties at the presidential level in 2014, China has financed dozens of Egyptian infrastructure projects, ranging from power plants to highways, while Egypt has provided diplomatic backing on international issues. In 2024, Egypt even gained entry into the expanded B.R.I.C.S. bloc, joining China as an ally in the Global South.
The Egypt–China story stretches back to the 1950s. Egypt was the first Arab/African country to recognize the People’s Republic of China in 1956. Cold War-era politics and regional shifts led to periods of friction, but the relationship never fully froze. Under Presidents Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Xi, ties have strengthened. During el-Sisi’s 2014 visit to Beijing, the two countries signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement, linking China’s then-new Belt and Road Initiative with Egypt’s development agenda. In subsequent years, Beijing pledged billions of dollars in investment, and Chinese companies won major construction contracts in Egypt.
Even as Egypt pursues ties with China, it has not severed ties with other partners. Since 2022, Cairo has secured large support packages from the Gulf, Europe, and the I.M.F. alongside Chinese financing. In early 2024 alone, Egypt secured approximately $35 billion in investment pledges from the U.A.E., a $5 billion expansion of the I.M.F. loan, $6 billion from the World Bank, and €7.4 billion in E.U. aid, in addition to Chinese credit. Still, Beijing plays a unique role. China’s willingness to offer turnkey, build-finance operations has helped fund projects that many Western actors shy away from.
One of the most visible symbols of the Cairo–Beijing nexus is Egypt’s ambitious new administrative capital, located 45 km east of Cairo in the desert. Chinese firms have built much of this project. For example, the China State Construction Engineering Corporation (C.S.C.E.C.)—a Chinese state-owned giant—constructed the city’s Iconic Tower (a 400-meter skyscraper, now Africa’s tallest) along with dozens of offices, hotels, and residences in the central business district. Financing was also largely Chinese: the $3.8 billion development was funded approximately 85% by Chinese banks and 15% by the Egyptian government. In June 2025, the Egyptian government even formally “handed the keys” of the new central business district to C.S.C.E.C. Under this deal, C.S.C.E.C. will now operate, maintain, and manage the district—essentially giving a Chinese state firm responsibility for a strategic urban hub.
China’s influence is also evident in other aspects of Egyptian infrastructure. A Chinese-Egyptian consortium has won contracts to build Egypt’s first high-speed rail lines. By mid-2025, Egypt is preparing to launch a 2,000-kilometer network of high-speed and regional trains. In 2022, China also completed an electric Light Rail Transit (L.R.T.) line from Cairo to the new capital, at a cost of approximately $10 billion.
Along the Suez Canal, China has likewise staked a claim. Egypt and China jointly operate the Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, a special industrial area launched in 2008 to attract Chinese manufacturers. This zone has become a focal point for the Chinese industry in Africa. As of today, it hosts over 150 Chinese companies (in sectors like textiles, construction, electronics, and auto parts), and has drawn roughly $3 billion in Chinese investment, nearly 40% of Egypt’s total F.D.I. in recent years. Chinese automakers, such as B.Y.D. and Chery, are establishing electric-vehicle assembly plants there. Ports at the canal—for example, in Ain Sokhna—have been expanded with Chinese financing, and new power and logistics projects are under discussion.
China and Egypt today trade tens of billions of dollars worth of goods each year, but the balance heavily favors China. Egyptian government data show that, in 2023, trade with China totaled $13.9 billion, down from $16.6 billion in 2022. Crucially, nearly all China–Egypt trade is Chinese exports to Egypt: in 2023, imports from China totaled approximately $12.9 billion, while Egypt’s exports to China were only $909 million. In 2023, the main Egyptian exports to China were commodities, including fuels and oils ($414 million), cement and stone ($116 million), and fruits ($78 million), among others. By contrast, Chinese exports to Egypt in 2023 included $4.3 billion of machinery and electronics, as well as substantial quantities of steel, textiles, and plastics. In short, Egypt tends to export raw materials to China and import manufactured goods, which are generally worth more, in return. This leaves Egypt with an enormous trade deficit, drawing concern from trade analysts. Analyst Giulia Interesse notes that “Egypt’s exports to China [are] overwhelmingly composed of raw commodities—particularly energy—raising concerns about the long-term sustainability of this economic dynamic.” In 2021, for example, Egypt’s trade deficit with China reached $17 billion, illustrating the significant imbalance in the flow of goods in favor of China.
On the investment front, the pattern is more balanced, although still tilted toward China. Chinese firms have invested substantial capital in Egypt’s economy. Over the past decade, China has become one of the biggest foreign investors in Egypt. Chinese companies are active in the energy sector (power plants, solar farms), as well as in various industries (steel, electronics, and construction). Meanwhile, Egypt’s investments in China are still small (on the order of a few hundred million dollars per year).
Egypt’s state planners argue that this capital helps drive growth. The government is explicitly courting more Chinese projects in technology and manufacturing; for instance, inviting China to partner on electric-vehicle factories, mobile-phone assembly, and high-tech zones. Some Egyptian officials view China as a partner willing to finance projects that many Western lenders are hesitant to touch. For example, analysts note that no major Western firm now offers the same kind of build-and-finance deals that Chinese banks and contractors do. Indeed, Beijing’s state banks have stepped in to support Egypt’s finances at critical moments. During the 2023 economic crisis, the China Development Bank and the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank jointly injected $1.4 billion into Egypt’s IMF stabilization program.
Economic ties have been matched by growing cultural and diplomatic engagement. Tourism between China and Egypt has surged. In 2024, some 300,000 Chinese tourists visited Egypt—a 63% increase over 2023—lured by Egypt’s ancient heritage and government efforts to attract Chinese travelers. Egyptian officials hope that number will continue climbing: just before the pandemic, Egypt received under 100,000 Chinese visitors per year, but recent plans aim for three million Chinese visitors annually by 2028. To facilitate this, Egypt has added Chinese-language signage at major sites, encouraged hotels to offer Chinese cuisine, and eased visa requirements for Chinese nationals. Direct flights between China and Cairo have increased, and tourist promotions are targeting Chinese travelers as key to achieving Egypt’s 2025 goal of 18 million total visitors.
Politically, Egypt has been careful to align with China on key diplomatic issues. Cairo has repeatedly reaffirmed its support for the “One China” policy, even as Egypt balances its relations with the West. El-Sisi himself told military academies in 2022 that Egypt’s stance on Taiwan is “unchangeable” in the interest of regional stability. Egypt has also signed mutual non-interference agreements with China and publicly endorsed China’s positions at forums such as the United Nations. Meanwhile, both militaries have initiated modest cooperation. In 2024, their navies conducted joint exercises in the Mediterranean, and discussions have been held about future arms sales (some media outlets even speculated about Egypt’s potential purchase of Chinese fighter jets).
Despite the surface warmth, observers point out potential pitfalls in the China–Egypt relationship. One obvious concern is the large trade deficit: an economy that relies heavily on imported Chinese machinery but exports mostly raw goods is vulnerable to external shocks and often fails to generate as many local jobs. Critics also warn of a possible “debt trap.” China is now one of Egypt’s top creditors, Egypt’s fourth-largest after traditional donors, with roughly $8 billion owed to Chinese banks and agencies (about 5% of Egypt’s external debt). Although the el-Sisi government insists that these loans are commercially priced and manageable, some economists worry that if projects underperform, Egypt may struggle to repay them. A China-focused research article cautions that “China’s dominance in bilateral trade has raised concerns about trade imbalances and the risk of Egypt absorbing surplus Chinese goods or high-emission industrial capacity.”
Questions have also been raised over strategic independence. Egypt has effectively allowed a Chinese state firm (C.S.C.E.C.) to run the core of its new capital city, a move that one analyst, Sari Arho Havrén, called “unprecedented” and “a huge project that brings Egypt even closer to China.” Detractors recall episodes in other African capitals (such as unfounded spying claims at the African Union building in Addis Ababa) to caution about over-dependence on Beijing for critical infrastructure. At the same time, some Western policymakers worry that Egypt’s deepening ties with China, especially now as both are B.R.I.C.S. members, could complicate Cairo’s relations with Washington and European capitals. Indeed, while China touts itself as a partner of the Global South, observers note that the increased Chinese presence often comes with political strings attached.
For now, however, Egypt’s leadership appears to view the relationship pragmatically. Cairo is leveraging China’s funding and expertise to build megaprojects and stimulate growth, even as it also courts Gulf and Western partners for balance. China, for its part, views Egypt as a linchpin of its Middle East and North Africa (M.E.N.A.) strategy—a stable state with regional influence and control of the Suez gateway. The coming months will test the evolution of this partnership. Xi’s anticipated visit, coupled with Egypt’s role in the next B.R.I.C.S. summit, will showcase the relationship on the world stage. Success will depend on making large investments truly mutually beneficial. So far, the “golden decade” of China-Egypt relations has yielded significant projects and enhanced diplomatic ties. But sustainability will require carefully managing debt, boosting real trade, and respecting each other’s sovereignty—challenges both countries now publicly acknowledge.
(With contribution by Hasena Yahya)
