Captagon’s role in the drug trade is closely linked to regional conflicts and has contributed to instability and addiction throughout the Middle East. Originally developed as a stimulant in West Germany in the 1960s, Captagon was intended to function similarly to other amphetamines, including Adderall and Ritalin, by heightening focus and attentiveness. By the 1980s, most countries had banned Captagon due to evidence that prolonged use leads to addiction, violent behavior, and major health risks. The drug induces euphoria and a sense of invincibility among users, making it a popular party drug among youth in the Gulf region.

Research by Cerues indicates that Captagon entered Middle Eastern markets via Bulgarian traffickers, who, with the support of their communist government, initially manufactured counterfeit versions of the pill. Following the transition to a democratic government and new laws declaring its illegality, these traffickers relocated their operations further south into the Middle East. Regional governments, such as Syria, have facilitated and protected production, resulting in increased distribution of Captagon despite its illegal status. Syria’s involvement in Captagon production grew after international sanctions against Bashar al-Assad and his government weakened Syria’s economy. The ease and low cost of Captagon production allowed Bashar to make huge profits, enriching high-ranking members of the elite and gangs that protected him politically. It also allowed him to seek revenge on Arab states, with addiction rates in rival states such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia serving as a form of retaliation. According to the Atlantic Council, over 40% of Saudi Arabian youth had used Captagon by 2023.

The Observatory of Political and Economic Networks, which monitors Captagon trade in the Arab world, stated that Assad’s regime earned an average of $2.4 billion annually from Captagon trade between 2020 and 2022. After the fall of the Assad government in late 2024, rebel forces seized several “food packaging” facilities across Syria, which had been used to manufacture, package, and distribute Captagon throughout the Arab world and beyond. Despite the collapse of the previous regime, Captagon production continues to prevail in Syria. According to The National, on Feb. 10, authorities seized 200,000 Captagon pills at the Syria-Iraq border. The new Syrian government, led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, has pledged to dismantle these trafficking networks and to end Syria’s reputation as a narco-state, initiating widespread raids on production facilities. Nevertheless, the Arab Center DC reports that certain Syrian militia leaders continue to participate in the drug trade, including individuals whom al-Sharaa has sought to integrate into the Syrian national army. This ongoing involvement illustrates the slow pace of holding leadership accountable for corruption.

While the new Syrian government has focused on transparency in its campaign against drug traffickers to rebuild trust among civilians and neighboring states, critics have conveyed concerns about the environmental consequences of these efforts. The Conflict and Environment Observatory notes that authorities have publicly disposed of seized drugs, frequently sharing these actions on social media. Methods such as dumping into wastewater systems, depositing waste in mixed landfills, and open-air burning pose major environmental risks. These actions further diminish the quality of life for populations already affected by environmental degradation resulting from warfare and the use of hazardous chemicals.

Furthermore, new Captagon production hubs, such as Sudan, have been emerging. According to an analyst from the Arab Center DC, amidst ongoing civil conflict between the Sudanese Army (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the stimulant is taken to enhance aggression and combat performance, thereby perpetuating conflict and instability. In September 2025, the SAF reported the discovery of several Captagon factories near Khartoum in areas previously controlled by the RSF, suggesting RSF involvement in production. Analysts also note that Captagon shipments have originated from SAF-controlled Port Sudan on the Red Sea, suggesting bribery and corruption among local forces and customs officials. Ongoing state involvement, combined with insufficient enforcement and accountability, has enabled the expansion of criminal Captagon economies.

This situation is critical to address as Captagon further contributes to regional unrest by driving addiction and aggression among civilians and military personnel, and redirecting financial resources from social services to drug enforcement operations, which creates more problems for international agencies to address. Several measures have been implemented to reduce Captagon production, including sanctions against states identified as suppliers. However, some observers argue that sanctions may unintentionally incentivize narcotics trafficking, as diminished exports and fiscal capacity further entrench the state in relying on Captagon to fill its financial vacuum. This calls for a new incentive: rather than shutting out states that produce Captagon, we should discuss solutions to diversify unstable economies while guaranteeing the cessation of Captagon production.

States are encouraged to work with international monitors to enhance surveillance inside regions historically prone to lawlessness, where weak institutional protections against traffickers leave them vulnerable. These monitors should coordinate with state-funded local law enforcement to verify laboratory closures, extradite traffickers, and ensure the state is transparent to civilians and international organizations about how it is combating the issue. While there are always risks of false compliance, isolation alone has historically increased reliance on illicit economies, so the solution must be multilateral.

Additionally, analysts such as Qutaiba Idibi, Project Manager of the Syria Program at the Atlantic Council, emphasize that the United States can strengthen efforts to disrupt domestic drug networks that finance Captagon producers, thereby impeding the flow of capital into the trade. Furthermore, addressing addiction through treatment initiatives also helps reduce demand for Captagon, weakening incentives towards producers and improving the health of those impacted. Betsy Dribben, Head of Advocacy for the Multifaith Alliance, stresses the importance of educating the medical community and fostering grassroots support to increase awareness of Captagon addiction. At present, medical treatment facilities in the region are inadequately able to address drug addiction, largely due to the prevailing perception of addiction as a criminal issue rather than a health concern. Implementing rehabilitative approaches is important for developing evidence-based medical protocols aimed at addressing Captagon addiction. Additionally, international players should identify and designate individuals involved in the Captagon trade, including those operating abroad, as their involvement is often obscured by geographic distance outside conflict zones.