New Zealand Reports Second Live-Fire Drill By Chinese Navy

On Saturday, February 22, New Zealand officials announced that three Chinese warships had conducted a nearby live-fire drill following similar exercises the day prior. Although the drills took place in international waters, New Zealand remains concerned about their potential to exacerbate tensions in the region. According to The Guardian, Defense Minister Judith Collins relayed her surprise at the drills, noting that she has “certainly never seen a task group of this capability undertaking this sort of work, it’s certainly a change.” This pattern of activity underscores Beijing’s mounting naval prowess and readiness to project power in the Indo-Pacific region.

Regional leaders have provided a range of responses to these events. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese acknowledged that the drills were in line with international law, but also expressed that Beijing could have given the New Zealand government more notice. In comparison, New Zealand has taken a firmer stance. Defense Minister Collins interpreted the minimal notice as a lack of respect, noting that it was “opposed to what we would consider best practice, which is 12–24 hours.” In response, China dismissed these statements as “unreasonable accusations.” Yet following the drills, experts on Indo-Pacific security have raised concerns about the implications of these events. As reported by CNN, research fellow Collin Koh characterizes the Chinese presence in the Tasman Sea as “unusual and rather unprecedented. In recent years, the PLA Navy has shifted from near seas to far seas. They’re increasingly training themselves up to be a true blue-water navy.” 

From the standpoint of peace preservation in the Indo-Pacific, the rising frequency of these drills is distressing. Although China asserts that its naval exercises serve purely defensive purposes, their proximity to other nations’ territorial waters can be perceived as a threat. Heightened militarization—even in international waters—could exacerbate regional friction. However, further amplifying these concerns risks overlooking the root causes of tension. Instead of focusing solely on criticism, a more constructive approach would consider historical regional dynamics to foster a proactive and reconciliatory path forward.

Nevertheless, China’s hegemonic stance in the Indo-Pacific follows a steady increase in aggressive action over the past decade. During this period, Beijing has engaged in disputes over maritime claims in the South China Sea and has increased its naval reach by constructing artificial islands. It has also carried out joint exercises with other militarily influential nations, such as Russia. These strategic maneuvers have drawn international attention, leading countries like the United States, Australia, and Japan to voice their concern about apparent attempts to challenge established maritime norms. This second live-fire drill underscores the broader context of China’s military modernization and its implications for the Indo-Pacific region.

Looking ahead, these developments reinforce the need for diplomatic engagement and clear communication to prevent accidental conflicts at sea. While it is within China’s right to conduct exercises in international waters, repeated live-fire drills raise questions about long-term strategic aims and regional balance. The immediate path toward peace and security involves creating channels for dialogue, confidence-building measures, and enforcing international maritime law. If governments maintain open lines of communication and prioritize conflict-prevention strategies, there is hope that these waters can remain a conduit for peaceful cooperation rather than a battleground for competing interests.

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