The leader of Belarus, Alexksandr Lukashenko, has found himself facing the largest protests in the independent history of his country. The regimes violent response has left the government isolated and under increasing pressure from an outraged international community. Lukashenko has had no choice but to turn his powerful ally for help: Russia.

Historically, Minsk and Moscow have maintained an extremely close relationship. Following the collapse of the USSR, Belarus declared independence in 1991. Within less than a decade, Belarus rotated back towards Russia with the two countries forming a Union State in the year 2000. This paved the way for political and economic integration, leaving Belarus economically dependent on Russia. Currently, 46% of Belarusian exports are sold to Russia compared to just 24% to EU countries. Russia is the country’s largest creditor holding an estimated 38% of Belarus’s national debt, while Russian support for the Belarus economy is estimated by Reuters to account for around 12% of the annual GDP. Russia and Belarus are, at least for now, economically inseparable. Losing Russian support for the Belarusian economy would have catastrophic consequences. Putin’s leverage over Lukashenko’s regime is therefore vast. 

Despite this special relationship, the Kremlin has been somewhat withdrawn in its response to its old ‘friends’ calls for help. Offering mostly symbolic support – such as the visit to Minsk on September 3rd by the Russian PM – as supposed to direct intervention on Lukashenko’s behalf. So, what is Putin’s end game?

Since the inception of the Union State, plans for further economic, political, and military integration have been pushed on Belarus by the Kremlin. One of the flagship integration policies is the creation of a common currency with both countries using the Russian Ruble. In 2008, after several delays to the plan, the National Bank of Belarus declared that not only would Belarus keep its version of the Ruble, but it would also be pegged to the United States dollar as opposed to its Russian counterpart. Stanislav Bogdankevich, former head of the National Bank, called the decision political, saying it was tied to Belarus open displeasure at Russia’s decision to hike oil and gas export prices to Belarus.

Even as recently as October 2019, Vladimir Makei, Belarus’ foreign minister, responded to Russia’s call for further integrations by stating that ‘’they are unacceptable’’. Lukashenko’s regime has been taking a hardline approach to rejecting further integration measures for decades – it is the demonstrations that have driven Lukashenko back into Putin’s arms.

Andrei Yeliseyeu, EAST center Think Tank, believes that the role of the Kremlin is going to play a ‘‘critical’’ role in the fate of Lukashenko’s regime. Currently, Putin is “biding his time”, waiting for Lukashenko to hit rock bottom at which point the Kremlin’s bargaining power will be amplified by Lukashenko’s increasingly fragile position. If the protesters continue to gain momentum, and Lukashenko becomes ever more desperate for Putin’s help, refusing to sacrifice sovereignty in return for favour with Moscow will become a luxury that Lukashenko can ill afford, at which point the Kremlin will be able to squeeze crucial concessions of ’integration’ out of Minsk in return for intervention on his behalf.

Allowing Putin to pursue his objective of further integration between the two states which would entail a transfer of sovereignty over Belarus from Minsk to Moscow, solidifying Russia’s hold over its neighbor. Until this ‘perfect moment’ arises, Putin is likely to continue sending gestures of support for Lukashenko whilst reminding the intentional community that Belarus is very much still within Russia’s ‘sphere of influence’.

The international community must tread carefully, any interference on behalf of the demonstrators is likely to fuel the regime’s narrative that claims the uprising is a product of a western conspiracy to oust Lukashenko. It is the organic nature of the protests that makes them so threatening to the regime and the international community should be careful not to tarnish this image. On the other hand, pressure can be applied to the Kremlin – and it should be. Sanctions should be threatened and large-scale co-operative projects between the EU and Russia such as the Nord Stream 2 pipeline must be put on hold until the Kremlin agrees not to intervene on behalf of ‘Europe’s last dictator’.