In the aftermath of what the U.S. President Donald Trump called the “12-day war,” Iran’s nuclear capabilities were seemingly destroyed, with lingering doubts from leaked intelligence. While the regional conflict de-escalated on a relatively sound note, China remained on the sidelines during this major geopolitical upheaval, despite having significant stakes in the escalating conflict and aspirations to shape Middle East policy.
As Iran’s partner for decades, China has invested heavily in Iran’s oil industry, with the U.S. Energy Information Administration estimating roughly 80% to 90% of Iran’s oil exports going to China. The 2021 Iran–China agreement further integrated the two countries’ commercial interests, while providing the isolated Iran with an opportunity to seek economic, political, and technological support. Beijing is more than happy to take discounted oil from another authoritarian regime, while Tehran desperately needs a global superpower as an ally. The two countries, along with Russia, have also held joint military exercises. However, recent developments in the region may prompt Iran and other countries in the Global South to reassess China’s reliability during times of conflict.
In an article published by The Atlantic, author Leon Aron cast skepticism on the “anti-American triad,” which includes Russia, China, and Iran, citing the incompetence of the alliance during crises: “In calmer times, China, like Russia, is happy to use Iran as a battering ram against the U.S. and its allies. But when tensions turn into military confrontation and global stability is at risk, backing Iran looks like a far less sensible investment to Beijing than preserving its own economic and diplomatic relations with the West.” Beijing avoided providing any military aid to Iran and remained directly uninvolved in the conflict. Instead, it adopted a cautious approach, stressing diplomacy over assigning further blame. During a call with his Israeli counterpart on June 14th, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stopped short of condemning Israel’s actions. President Xi Jinping waited four days before urging de-escalation and stating that China was willing to work with all sides to help restore peace and stability in the Middle East. Interviewed by the Associate Press, think tank fellow Craig Singleton summed up Beijing’s responses as steady oil buys and ritual calls for dialogue: “No drones or missile parts, no emergency credit line. Just words calibrated to placate Tehran without rattling Riyadh or inviting U.S. sanctions.”
Given China’s limited response during this crisis, nations in the Middle East and the broader Global South would be wise to reevaluate their strategic relationships with Beijing. While China often presents itself as a dependable alternative to the West—offering investment, infrastructure, and diplomatic support—its actions suggest a clear prioritization of its own national interests, particularly economic stability, a positive global image, and the avoidance of direct confrontation. When faced with a real geopolitical test, China chose caution over commitment, distancing itself from Iran at a moment of need to safeguard its broader trade relationships and shield itself from potential Western backlash. As the Washington Post observed, “China sat on the sidelines” of the Israel-Iran conflict, unwilling to put its economic ties or global ambitions at risk. Alliances grounded in transactional economics but lacking in credible security commitments may falter under pressure. However, the Post also noted that Washington’s use of military force—and China’s lack thereof—could also help Beijing portray itself as a more rational global power, even if its influence in the region is limited. While the Trump administration may be “stuck fighting unpopular wars,” Xi’s China continues to tread a fine line, maintaining a fragile neutrality.
