On 20 January, Melanie Joly, Canadian minister of Foreign Affairs, revealed that her government had been mandated by the Cameroonian government to facilitate peace talks between itself and the Anglophone secessionist forces in the Nation’s North and South-western regions. These regions have an Anglophone majority, while the Cameroonian government is Francophone, along with the population at large. Protracted conflict between government and secessionist forces have bloodied these regions since 2017, causing mass displacement, human-rights abuses, and death. The Anglophone separatists want to establish an independent country called Ambazonia in the Anglophone regions of Cameroon. Although the Canadians appeared keen on mediating a path to peace, the Cameroon’s authorities would soon deny entrusting this role to any outside country. Since then, Al Jazeera reported a “spokesperson for the Anglophone separatists, said they had taken note of the government’s latest statement but would not comment further.”

In 2019, amid fighting in the Anglophone regions, the government granted the North-West and South-West special status. Although this legal and policy change could potentially have paved the way toward peaceful negotiations, the move failed to quell the secessionist ambitions of fighters in the Anglophone regions. According to a report by the International Crisis Group, these outcomes “reflect the government’s failure to adequately consult Anglophone leaders in advance, but also the reality that little has changed on the ground.” Indeed, while the special status “notionally gives the Anglophone regions increased autonomy by creating regional assemblies with greater powers than Francophone regional councils, the assemblies remain weak and under the thumb of governors appointed in the capital Yaoundé.” This means that they will be mostly inadequate for discussing the “educational, judicial, and linguistic issues that go to the heart of Anglophone identity.” The report recommends that the special status be reformed to address limitations. This could, if done collaboratively with the Anglophone community, shore-up Anglophone autonomy, laying the foundation for a broader settlement.

The question lies in whether both sides can come together for constructive dialogue. The answer I believe is complex, as the current conflict is rooted in historical factors, that have produced generational trauma and hatred on both sides, imbuing many with a zero-sum perspective on the conflict. Initially, Cameroon as we now know it, was an amalgam of territories controlled by the British and French during the Colonial era. The Anglophone regions were known then as Southern Cameroon and administered by Britain as part of Nigeria. The territory making up modern Cameroon was ruled by France until its independence on 1 January 1960. In October 1961, the former British mandated territory voted to reunite with the former French mandated Cameroonian territory. Both had been separated from the German Kamerun after Germany’s defeat in World War One. The aim was for Cameroon to be united, as they were under the Germans, though this time under a federal government.

The vote to unify is to this day controversial. Many in Southern Cameroon favoured forming an independent nation, though Britain, administering the area under a UN Trust, believed the territory was too small to be economically viable. With the UN, Britain decided to hold a plebiscite, where the population could vote either to become a part of Nigeria or to unify with the newly independent State formed from Francophone Cameroon. In February 1961, voters chose to unify, bringing together the former British and French Colonies into an independent Cameroonian Nation-State.

A federal structure helped maintain limited autonomy in the Anglophone regions, but the central government, a Francophone entity, quickly reconfigured the system to consolidate power in Yaoundé, effectively marginalizing the Anglophone regions. This triggered decades of dispute between the State and Anglophone resistance groups, causing the Yaoundé government to promise decentralization to soothe Anglophone anxieties. This culminated in the 1996 constitution, which allowed for more power to be allocated to some regions.

This provision was mostly untouched until 2019, where the government enacted a law that changed the “regional councils” in the two Anglophone regions into more powerful “regional assemblies”. These assemblies and their political rights are what make up the ‘special status’ policy. In its current phase, this 6-year long conflict has claimed 6,000 lives and displaced hundreds of thousands, leaving an estimated 600,000 children without an education. The government’s brutal military campaigns in the North and South-West, along with the Separatists’ determination to fight on regardless of humanitarian cost, has made dialogue and non-aggression extremely challenging.

Responsibility in recent years does nonetheless lie mainly with the Yaoundé Francophone government. Firstly, the government failed to participate in a Swiss-facilitated initiative launched in 2019. This left separatist groups that complied to wait in vain for the government to join them. Yaoundé then launched a separate dialogue, without consulting separatist leaders. In January 2023, despite ‘months of discreet talks with Ottawa and prominent separatist groups, Yaoundé eventually decided not to join a new Canada-led facilitation initiative’, leaving the Canadians and those separatists who were willing to discuss in limbo. Given these circumstances, it is small wonder that there is little enthusiasm on the Anglophone side to engage constructively, especially among those with more radical aspirations. The outcome is a stalemate between the Cameroonian government and Anglophone separatists, with peace processes being obstructed and slowed down.

For progress to happen, the Yaoundé government must be pressured to take initiative in de-centralizing power, through genuine consultation with Anglophone groups in the North-West and South-West regions. Movement should be triggered towards establishing a more Federalised system, which fairly represents all sections of Cameroonian society, not just the Francophone majority. Where the bulk of political power lies in Yaoundé, it is the State’s responsibility to engage these domestic challenges and to co-operate where necessary with foreign mediators.

Fundamentally this crisis boils down to a choice between centralised and federal rule. Moreover, despite the best intentions of Canadian and Swiss peacekeepers, these constitutional, linguistic, and geographical schisms are distinctly African problems, rooted in Cameroon’s specific conditions, shaped by Colonialism, ethnic conflict, and inheritance of institutions designed neither by, nor for Cameroonians themselves. This is therefore a matter of African problems needing African solutions. For those African solutions to be achieved, the Yaoundé government must engage earnestly with the Separatists. Without this initiative, then any foreign intervention will not yield any serious prospects for peace.