North Korean leader Kim Jong Un urged strengthening “nuclear shield and sword.” Then, Kim emphasized the country’s nuclear program as a safeguard of security. Shortly after U.S. President Donald J. Trump reaffirmed the denuclearization of North Korea, Pyongyang rejected it.

“The powerful deterrent, namely, the logic of peacekeeping and security by force with nuclear forces as its backbone, is the inevitable stand of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” said Chairman Kim during the meeting with the country’s nuclear scientists and technicians on September 26. And he added, “Possessing strategic nuclear technological potential is a great encouragement for our party (the governing Korean Workers’ Party). It is a reliable guarantee for the triumphant advancement of our people’s struggle, our cause, and the future security of our nation.”

North Korea is unlikely to abandon its nuclear arsenal in the near future. On September 29, the Foreign Minister Kim Son Gyong addressed the United Nations’ General Assembly, saying, “We will never give up nuclear weapons, which is our state law, national policy, and sovereign power as well as the right to existence.” In 2023, Pyongyang wrote the advancement of nuclear weapons and its technology into the constitution. Such moves make Pyongyang’s nuclear possession a fait accompli and go against the global efforts of nuclear nonproliferation. Moreover, North Korea’s nuclear arming might cause the move of nuclear proliferation, especially in East Asia. The U.S. and international community should take a zero-tolerance approach. However, it is acknowledged that situations changed greatly from 2018, when President Trump sought to fulfill the denuclearization by personal diplomacy with Kim and the “art of the deal.”

North Korea’s nuclear program has a decades-long history. In 1965, Kim Il Song, the current leader’s grandfather, officially announced the start of the nuclear weapons program. In 1993, Pyongyang announced the withdrawal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (N.P.T.), sparking the so-called Korean Peninsula crisis. After the incident, the U.S. proposed the “Agreed Framework,” which provided for the supply of crude oil and a light-water reactor in exchange for the abandonment of the nuclear program. However, in 2003, Pyongyang exited from the N.P.T. and conducted its first nuclear test in 2006. (By 2017, there were six nuclear tests) Past U.S. administrations made efforts to abandon North Korea’s nuclear weapons and its missiles, including economic sanctions and unofficial dialogues. Notably, the Trump administration’s first term placed “maximum pressure” on Pyongyang, including economic coercion. Then, Trump talked with Kim Jong Un three times. However, the denuclearization was not completed. On the other hand, Joseph R. Biden Jr. was reluctant to engage in personal diplomacy with Kim, while he kept most of the restrictive measures against the D.P.R.K..

The U.S. faces the dilemma over North Korea’s nuclear issues. Sticking to the denuclearization policies is a tough path: Economic sanctions have been imposed since 2006. Striking the nuclear facilities, just like that, Israel and the U.S. attacked Iran in June 2025, is nearly impossible. Pyongyang has air superiority, and retaliation is likely to follow. Even if successful, in terms of destroying facilities, the knowledge about nuclear weapons seems to be shared among scientists and technicians. (Even in Iran’s case, the series of air bombings delayed the nuclear development for months or a few years.) On the other hand, recognizing Pyongyang as a “de facto” nuclear state like India and Pakistan has significant risks. Ballistic missiles against the U.S. and its allies (e.g., Japan and South Korea) might continue to be placed. Above all, the “chain reaction” of nuclear proliferation in East Asia might start. According to the poll conducted by Gallup Korea in February 2024, 91.1% of respondents expressed a pessimistic view about the D.P.R.K.’s denuclearization, and 72.8% called for nuclear possession on their own. Seoul’s nuclear arming is likely to trigger a domino effect of nuclearization in the Northeast Asia region, with Tokyo and Taipei possibly following suit. This means the collapse of American nuclear extended deterrence. Neither way is an easy path for Washington and its allies. Time is ticking.