On September 1, 2025, the Trump administration declared “Operation Southern Spear.” The operation has deployed immense naval assets, including the U.S. aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford, in the Caribbean Sea. Then, on January 3, 2026, Washington carried out “Operation Absolute Resolve”, capturing the Venezuelan President, Nicholas Maduro, and his wife, Cilia Flores. The U.S.’s pressure campaign against Venezuela reminds the world of one thing: Gunboat Diplomacy.
What is gunboat diplomacy? James Eric Sydney Cable, British diplomat and researcher on naval strategy, defined gunboat diplomacy as “the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage or avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state,” in his book, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1991: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force. More specifically, Cable categorized the coercion by naval battleships into four: Definitive force which creates or removes a fait accompli, purposeful force which changes the policy or regime of foreign government, catalystic force which deploy available force to buy a breathing space or present policy makers with an increased range of options, and expansive forces to emphasize attitudes and express emotion as a nation.
The United States has deployed gunboat diplomacy several times in its history, commonly through purposeful force in combination with other forms. In 1853, an American squadron arrived at Uraga, the entrance to Edo Bay (currently Tokyo Bay), to demand the normalization of diplomatic relations and trade with Japan and the supply of food and fuel to U.S. whaling vessels. The presence of naval forces coerced the Tokugawa Shogunate, which ruled the archipelago from 1603 to 1867, into signing the 1854 Kanagawa Treaty. The treaty ended the so-called “Sakoku” policy, a two-century-long policy of selective diplomatic and commercial engagement with the outer world, except for Korea, Qing China, and the Netherlands. In 1907, then-U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt dispatched the so-called “Great White Fleet,” composed of 16 battleships, around the globe to show the world the significance of American naval power.
Despite the rise of air power and nuclear weapons, naval power has remained a significant component of American diplomatic and military strategy. In 1996, the Bill Clinton administration sent the aircraft carrier striking group to Taiwan after China’s threats to invade the island, as pro-independence president Li Denghui was expected to win his reelection. (Ironically, the name of one U.S. aircraft was “Independence.”) Similarly, in October 2023, Washington sent the U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford to the Mediterranean Sea in the wake of Hamas’s October 7 attack to show support for Israel.
On August 19, 2025, the U.S. military deployed three guided-missile destroyers to the waters off Venezuela. Within weeks, three amphibious assault ships and other vessels arrived there. On September 2, Washington began strikes against alleged drug-carrying vessels in the Caribbean and other seas. On October 24, the U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered the U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford, America’s latest aircraft carrier, to the region, marking a major escalation as the total number of U.S. troops increased to 12,000, along with a dozen battleships, by November 16. In December, the U.S. continued to intensify military operations by seizing several oil tankers headed to the South American nation and launching drone strikes. In retrospect, the dispatch of several warships, including the Gerald R. Ford, was the sign of the capture of Nicholas Maduro, as Cable’s theory shows.
However, the use of naval power during the Venezuelan crisis seems different from previous cases. For example, the choice to use naval power to concretely influence regime change differs from earlier gunboat diplomacy. Based on Cable’s arguments, both uses of aircraft carriers during the Taiwan Strait crisis and the October 7 attack seem to be “expressive force”, showing the support or opposition to a specific nation and its policy. While “purposeful force” might be a plausible example, few show the actual regime change.
The use of naval powers against Venezuela is problematic. To begin, coercive diplomacy, including gunboat diplomacy, is highly likely to fail. According to research by Robert Art and Patrick Cronin, the success rate of US-led coercive diplomacy between 1992 and 2001 is only 33.3%. One reason is insatiable demands and regime survival: When demands threaten the sovereignty or very survival of a regime, the target has little choice but to resist. “Insatiable demands” by the compeller leave incumbents with no option other than digging in. As the Trump administration seeks regime change in Venezuela, this reason could explain why the U.S. removed Maduro by force, as the naval pressure campaign showed its limits.
Moreover, gunboat-style coercive diplomacy could negatively affect U.S. soft power and global order. Firstly, it may remind some Asian nations of the memory of gunboat diplomacy and colonialism during the 19th century. Furthermore, focusing naval resources on a specific nation might send wrong signals to the U.S. adversaries, especially Russia and China. As the Trump administration repeatedly emphasizes the so-called “Donroe doctrine,” placing the Western Hemisphere as the sphere of interests, Moscow and Beijing might do the same thing in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region.
Luckily, there are wiser alternatives. Naval assets should serve as a tool, not a substitute, for strategy itself. President Trump should rethink the words of Theodore Roosevelt, his most respected American President: Speak softly, and carry a stick.
Unlike during the 19th century, gunboat diplomacy doesn’t seem to be successful for the U.S. Empirical studies don’t support the use of coercive tactics involving naval assets. Moreover, it might damage the U.S.’s international reputation and drain military resources into one nation, while naval power is really needed to deter China in the Indo-Pacific region. Diplomacy is an extension of military force. Military force is only subordinate to diplomacy.
