The President of Algeria, Abdelmadjid Tebboune, has been re-elected for a second term, in an election that produced a record low turnout and much criticism. Out of 45 million citizens in the country, last week’s election saw just over 5.5 million people cast a vote. Since his election after the Hirak protest movement in 2019, which deposed the country’s previous president, Tebboune has done little to address concerns that culminated in Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s ouster in the first place.

As was the case before 2019, the relationship between the government and military is uncomfortably close. Amnesty International has spoken out against Tebboune’s recent efforts to silence opposition parties, the media, and civil society groups. Despite mounting dissatisfaction with the President, Algerians have become more and more disillusioned with the political system, especially the youth. Unemployment has risen to 30% despite Algeria’s ample natural resources.

The military’s control of the election cast doubts on the legitimacy of the results. The three presidential candidates, including Tebboune, questioned the results of the election. Following the discovery of hundreds of thousands of “errors”, the Constitutional Court ruled that Tebboune won 84% of the vote instead of the initially reported 95%. Though Tebboune easily won the election, the Algerian government appears extremely weak. The North Africa Director of the International Crisis Group suggests that the Algerian military , who have a vested interest “in Tebboune remaining a weak president, dependent on their support,” is largely responsible for committing the electoral “errors”.

It is becoming increasingly obvious that both Tebboune and the military are not remotely interested in democracy, and neither are able to solve deep-seated issues that affect millions of Algerians. Further divisions between the two, however, will only lead to instability throughout the country. It would not be surprising if Algerians decide to resurrect the Hirak movement. In light of the arrest of political activists and stringent limitations on press freedoms, authorities may resort to violence should any protests break out in due course. However, sanctions on Russian gas since 2022 mean that much of the international community, and Europe in particular, rely on Algerian gas exports more than ever. Brussels, London, Paris, and Berlin are likely to do little to disrupt or criticise Algeria’s current leadership as a result.

If Algeria hopes to avoid bloody clashes on the street, the military must have no say in the affairs of state any longer. This will by no means be a straightforward process, but a clear division between the two could improve democratic legitimacy and political engagement over time. Without the military by Tebboune’s side, the erasure of human rights that has taken place in Algeria will slowly recede.