On Tuesday, January 28th, 2025, Jean-Noël Barrot, France’s Foreign Minister, stated in a post on his X account regarding the attack on the French Embassy in Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Although the influence of this incident remained in the press for only a few days, it carries significant meaning. The International TV Network (France 24) illustrated that not only France’s embassy, but also the embassies of Rwanda, Belgium, and the United States were all targeted in attacks. These events are interconnected in one way or another with the escalating tensions in Eastern Congo. This article aims to explore the dimensions of this situation and analyze how this cold conflict has evolved, particularly after large numbers of Rwandan groups (e.g., Hutus and Tutsis) moved to live in the Congo following the civil war in Rwanda in the 1990s.
The movement of Rwandans to the DRC has significantly shaped political interactions, particularly in Eastern Congo. On January 27th, 2025, a resident of Goma, a city in Eastern Congo, told the BBC, “All we can hear are gunshots around the city.” However, in the same BBC report, an official response to the situation in the DRC claimed that the government was able to maintain control over the area. The official statement emphasised, “[c]ontrary to the manipulative messages circulating on social networks, the FARDC [the DR Congo army] holds the Goma airport and all strategic points in the capital of North Kivu Province.” This illustrates the different narratives and perspectives regarding the conflict. On this basis, this essay will explore how the current cold conflict might expand its effects.
According to a report published by the Council on Foreign Relations, updated on February 11, 2025, during and after the civil war in Rwanda, approximately two million Hutu people moved to the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces (Eastern Congo), forming new power structures. Among these refugees were “Hutu extremists,” who began organising armed groups and militias. This essay examines the access to power on the ground by these groups and how various elements continue to fuel political tensions and conflict. This is relevant to the political polarisation attempted by Hutu extremists, who present themselves, and these large numbers of refugees, as victims or vulnerable people in need of protection, which can be used as an argument to own weapons, establish armed groups, and dominate the area. On the other side, the Rwandan regime has pursued a process of ‘securitisation,’ in which it frames the presence of Hutus in Congo as a potential threat, warning that genocide may occur again.
Securitisation, as defined by Ole Wæver, a member of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, refers to a process in which a “speech act” portrays a situation as an existential threat. (Wæver 2011). This process involves categorising the issue in such a way that it becomes securitised. This concept is applicable to how the Rwandan regime has supported the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group since 2022. The Rwandan government views the presence of Hutu groups in Eastern Congo as a security threat, which justifies its backing of M23.
In my perspective, strategies should be developed to dismantle extremism on both sides and avoid complicating the historical context of the Rwandan genocide by embedding it too deeply in the Congolese context. Instead of deepening divisions, the goal should be to create new narratives that foster cooperation and stability in Eastern Congo. For example, it is possible to train professionals to build stronger societies, moderate extremist ideologies that could escalate violence, and fight against discourses that only serve to incite rather than resolve conflict. The goal should not be to increase tensions for political gain, but to construct a path to resolution and avoid further destruction.
This essay argues that the plans for peace building and conflict resolution should be developed by regional powers and international organisations concerned with resolving the conflict. Countries like Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda are just a few of the nations that could be affected by the potential outcome of this (until now) relatively cold conflict. International organisations concerned by peace building also have a responsibility to take action, such as the United Nations, and they should play an active role in efforts to prevent escalation.
The process of peace building can be structured in several stages. The first phase should focus on reconciliation, the temporary interference of international forces, and the legal protection of Rwandan refugees under Congolese constitutional amendments. This would require the establishment of an international committee composed of specialists from the United Nations or other international bodies for the purpose of monitoring stability.
The second phase should involve setting clear agendas and values focused on two main objectives: peace building and conflict resolution. It is essential to integrate the values of human rights, dialogue, and democracy within the media, the education system, and other institutions in order to promote tolerance and fraternity between people and to stabilise the Eastern Congo. This phase should encourage the population to recognise shared interests in achieving long-term stability and prosperity.
Eventually, the third phase is no less important than previous phases. It includes complementary roles and everyday peace-building, where people implement the peace-building process by themselves. Professional training and logistic support are all required to integrate the flow of the third phase, which aims at a long-term conflict resolution.
