On July 6th, 4:01 AM GMT, Beijing conducted what it labelled a “routine part of China’s annual programme” by launching a missile with a dummy warhead from a nuclear-powered submarine in the South Pacific. This act would likely have already stirred international consternation. However, the test was also conducted on the same day as the signing of Australia and Fiji’s new mutual defense treaty, designed to directly counter Chinese influence in the Pacific. Whilst Canberra has declared this to be a coincidence and not a deliberate reaction from China, the optics and consequences are significantly more far-reaching, casting a shadow of doubt over the Indo-Pacific region.

The global reaction to this test has stretched from immediate outrage at the timing, to wider commentary on China’s influence in the region. Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles declared that whilst Beijing told Australia of its test plans hours before, it was left “very concerned about any actions which undermine the stability, the peace, and security of the Pacific.” Such worries were echoed by New Zealand, whose Foreign Minister Winston Peters added that “New Zealand considers this an unwelcome and concerning development” as Wellington has “no interest in China using the South Pacific as a testing site for missile capability.”

The government spokespeople seem to have focused on the wider symbols of this test as proof of China’s attempt to disrupt and dominate. However, turning to analysts, the debate instead considers whether China’s test was a deliberate reaction and warning to Australia and Fiji’s Ocean of Peace Alliance. The agreement saw Australia pledge over $1 billion over a decade on various operations in Fiji, emphasised by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese as “one of the most significant endeavours” Canberra has ever undertaken with another nation. The importance of such a treaty makes the analysts’ assessments all the more significant. Malcom Davis argued the missile test was “hardly a subtle riposte” and should instead be heeded as a “clear warning by Beijing.” Other analysts likewise label it an “escalation” and “demonstration of China’s displeasure at Canberra trying to secure its backyard.” However, such an opinion is still not unanimous. Mike Hughes instead argues that it “is unlikely the test is directly linked to the Australia-Fiji deal,” but, like the Australian and New Zealand governments, acknowledges a need to worry about China’s intent to dominate in the region.

The conduct and context of this test do not seem to point to a ‘coincidence.’ Its flight path was roughly 7,300 kilometers, likely flying over parts of the Philippines. Therefore, in several ways, it demonstrated a genuine strategic strike capability. Shortly after the test, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs cautioned Fiji and Australia regarding the use of the defence treaty to target, or harm the interests of, third parties such as China. The equivocation over intent, message and protocol represents a much wider issue. China is the most significant missile power to remain completely outside of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. This means it does not follow the protocols of the HCOC, including regulations on prelaunch notifications. This combination of factors increases the likelihood of miscalculation and escalation. Furthermore, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China’s complicated timing and refusal to follow HCOC risks providing cover for other states to do the same, including North Korea and Iran.

Perhaps it was a warning. Perhaps it was coincidence. Perhaps the fact that a nuclear-capable missile can arc across the Pacific and leave the world unable to tell the difference is, itself, the most dangerous outcome of all.