After a long investigation, the redacted version of the Brereton report was released to the public on November 19. The report examined the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) actions in Afghanistan between 2005 to 2016 and concluded that the Australian special forces murdered 39 civilians and prisoners of war, which was subsequently covered up. 25 current and former A.D.F. personnel have been identified as being directly involved or as accessories to the killings, with most of the incidents occurring in 2012 and 2013. The Brereton Report describes one completely redacted 2012 event “as possibly the most disgraceful episode in Australia’s military history” and describes how “the commanders at troop, squadron and task group level bear moral command responsibility for what happened under their command, regardless of personal fault.” Some analysts have speculated that the heavy redactions in the report are to prevent prejudice in future investigations and juries. Others like Glenn Kolomeitz, a former ADF. officer and lawyer, are critical of Australia’s Department of Defense citing a “reputation for over redacting material.”

Australia is a signatory nation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Article Three requires the humane treatment of individuals who are not participating in the conflict, including enemy combatants who have surrendered and those who are wounded. Ill treatment, such as torture and murder, is strictly prohibited, and the provision of medical aid is required. The Nuremberg principles are another important consideration. Specifically, Principle IV which states that even if an individual is ordered to commit an illegal act by their government or a superior, they are still responsible for their actions “under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.”

The report details three specific elements. Firstly, the practice of ‘blooding’ in junior members of the special forces, where patrol commanders would order the new recruits to execute detainees. Next is the pattern of covering up killings by placing military hardware such as a weapon or radio on victims to disguise the crime, known as ‘throwdowns.’ Finally, it discusses how responsibility for the killings resides specifically at the patrol command level and excludes officers from platoon and troop level upward from culpability. However, there is precedent for holding superiors responsible for criminal actions committed by their subordinates called the Yamashita principle. The Brereton report also states that: “Some domestic commanders…bear significant responsibility for contributing to the environment in which war crimes were committed, most notably those who embraced or fostered the ‘warrior culture’ and empowered, or did not restrain, the clique of non-commissioned officers who propagated it.”

In 2015, sociologist Dr. Samantha Crompvoets summarized allegations of war crimes committed by ADF. special forces in a letter to General Campbell of the ADF. She detailed a shift from “unacceptable behaviour” to war crimes within the special forces, a glorification of war crimes as actions of a “good soldier,” competition killing and blood lust, inhumane treatment of prisoners, and coverups of illegal killings as well as other atrocities. She also details strong allegations of ongoing coverups, including that Afghanis were reporting weekly to Australians, their interpreters, and NGOs that illegal killings were occurring, but the allegations were repeatedly silenced by special forces leadership in Afghanistan. An individual who was deployed multiple times with the special forces in 2012 described how an Afghan interpreter repeatedly reported that the special forces were killing farmers, yet it was never followed up on. The words of one interviewee are particularly damning: “Guys just had this bloodlust. Psychos. Absolute psychos. And we bred them”.

In a story strikingly reminiscent of the ‘free-fire zones’ that led to the killing of thousands of non-combatant civilians during the Vietnam war, Crompvoets also describes a practice of approaching villages by helicopter and gunning down the civilians who ran away, justifying the killings because they were “running for weapons caches.” She also alleged that some lawyers attached to the special forces assisted in covering up the murders. One particularly distressing report involved an incident where two 14-year-old boys were stopped on the road for being potential Taliban sympathizers. Special forces operators searched them and slit their throats, tossing their bodies into a nearby river. Crompvoets stresses “that this was not an isolated incident.” One soldier described the incidents as “sanctioned psychopathic behaviour.” Another interviewee recounts how the “same names would pop up with remarkable frequency,” and how despite similar patterns in “circumstances and witness accounts” this did not spark any investigation. Rather, these patrol commanders who were ordering and participating in these atrocities were being “rewarded with citations and medals for gallantry and worse still valour.” Special forces members report how this response only served to reinforce the culture of silence and conformity.

It remains to be seen how far up the chain of command future investigations and criminal charges will go. While it may be tempting to explain these crimes committed by the ADF special forces as a ‘few bad apples’ as some observers already have, it is important to consider Nick Turse’s position that “violence against Vietnamese non-combatants … was pervasive and systematic” and “widespread, routine, and directly attributable to U.S. command policies.” Whether the same can be said about the ADF in Afghanistan remains to be seen. Future trials will no doubt garner significant media attention and independent investigation. As one witness from Crompvoets letter alludes, “These things do not happen in isolation. They [soldiers] become more confident over time when they are there and these behaviours becomes permissible and equated with being good and effective soldiers.”