Russian politics often confuse the Western public. Holding elections and allowing (some) protests mimics the actions of a democratic regime, but Moscow’s sinister authoritarianism, particularly following its invasion of Ukraine, seems to contradict that assumption of democracy. This is because authoritarian regimes often make themselves look more legitimate by holding elections and engaging in other democratic processes, creating a guise of popular support in a method known as autocratic legitimation. As authoritarian nations adapted to the new international climate after the Cold War, legitimizing authoritarianism through democratic processes became common practice in these countries, and the number of electoral authoritarian regimes increased exponentially worldwide.
This shift, in turn, has led to a surge of research into why authoritarian regimes democratize this way, how they can be defeated in elections, and whether repeatedly holding elections encourages democratization within the regime. There is no doubt that democratization is more likely to occur in electoral authoritarian regimes, in comparison to other types of autocracies, but this depends on a lot of factors. For true democratization to occur in these conditions, there must be a strong party in opposition to the autocratic regime, external countries must exert pressure, and voters must co-ordinate with both of these groups.
Voters must overcome two dilemmas before they can participate in a truly democratic election. The first dilemma concerns voters who support the ruling party for fear of economic sanctions. Without the assurance that many other voters will vote for the opposition, these voters are likely to support the incumbent, autocratic candidate to avoid punishment from the regime. The second dilemma is regarding which opposition party voters should support. If many different oppositional parties run independently against the incumbent regime, votes will be split among them – as long as the opposition is weak and unco-ordinated, as it is in most electoral authoritarian regimes, there is little doubt that the powerful incumbent will win the election. Under these conditions, citizens of the electoral autocratic regime tolerate electoral misconduct, furthering the guise that autocracy holds the popular vote.
If oppositional parties unite, however, the resulting coalition can bring about a change in this perception. For example, take Serbia in the 1990s. A fragmented opposition failed to challenge President Slobodan Milošević’s regime, but when these parties came together before the presidential election in 2000, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (D.O.S.) had a profound impact on the Serbian political consciousness, leading to greater engagement, campaigning, and participation in the electoral process. When Milošević tried to manipulate the elections, state actors, the media, and even his own party prevented him from committing fraud to make himself come out ahead in the polls.
Despite the importance of increasing citizen engagement in politics, it is important to mention that opposition coalitions cannot effectively seize power from the autocracy when the autocracy itself controls the transfer of power. Upon Milošević’s defeat in September 2000, the Serbian Federal Election Commission refused to confirm the results, instead calling for a runoff between Milošević and his opponent. The Constitutional Court and Milošević himself only reversed their decision and agreed that the oppositional candidate had won after a month of massive nationwide resistance, including strikes, demonstrations, and blockades. Winning the support of the police force and other state apparati was crucial to securing a successful, nonviolent transition.
With coalitions’ ineffectiveness at democratizing regimes, perhaps a better strategy might involve creating international policy that supports democratization. This could be particularly successful now, with some E.U. Election Observation Mission reports in the last five years serving as an early-warning template for wider democratic regression. International institutions could provide support through a more multi-lateral dialogue and standard setting for these regimes.
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