Across the DMZ: The Need to Reconnect and Talk More with the Hermit Kingdom on a Regional Scale

On August 14th, three South Korean soldiers were injured by a landmine blast while patrolling outside their post in the South Korean side of the Demilitarized Zone, separating North and South Korea. The South Korean Military blamed the North Korea Military, stating that it was a “clear provocation by the North Korean Military”; and that “severe retaliation” could follow. The North Korean government denied all responsibility for the event, and relations between the two nations deteriorated as both nations issued threats of military retaliation against the other in events of further provocation.

Both nations reached a remarkable stance of military preparedness with both sides firing back and forth over the border with rockets and artillery; and although the event was later de-escalated by three days of talk at the border village of Panmunjom, ending on August 28th, the incident re-highlights the dangerous arrangement between the two nations and the almost constant threat of violence on the Korean Peninsula from North Korea’s constant game of brinkmanship.

Since the end of the Korean War with the Korean Armistice Agreement in 1953, North and South Korea have been in a hostile stalemate with each other. As South Korea retains an economic advantage over the North with GDP reaching 40 times over than that of its neighbor; the North bridges this gap by utilizing their military stance to institute a constant game of military brinkmanship, regularly threatening violence such as through their nuclear weapons program. According to the Korea Herald, the North Korean government have violated the armistice 221 times, including 26 military attacks . North Korean government’s actions have included assassination attempts on the South Korean President, bombings as well as military attacks on South Korean warships, jets and installations. However in 1990, incidents involving North Korea have turned “increasingly more violent and merciless”, demonstrating the increasing unpreparedness and inability to read the North Korean Authorities for any signs of aggression. The signs of such aggression and use of “military muscle” were reflected in Kim Jong-Un’s comment that the August 28th agreement was due to North Korea’s “tremendous military muscle, including its nuclear deterrent for self-defence”.

Although various approaches to tackling the problem have been made, the failure to maintain a consistent diplomatic stance between the South and North Korean government in combating the North’s aggressive tendencies can be seen in the failure of the Sunshine Policy of the 1990’s. The Sunshine Policy was explained by Pearl Jinju Kwon in her article THE RE-EVALUATION OF THE SUNSHINE POLICY: FAILURE OR SUCCESS? as “taking off the heavy coat of the North with warm sunshine instead of blowing howling gale” by foregoing any sense of military intervention into the North. This has been accompanied by the South’s provision of unconditional humanitarian aid to the North with no conditions in order to build confidence, good-faith and dialogue between the two states. However, such a programme has remained controversial as although it has promoted greater dialogue, it failed to decrease the conflict between the nations. Especially as the North Korea unveiled its nuclear programme and successful tests in 2006 and 2009, with some proclaiming the policy’s provision of aid for the North as aiding in its nuclear development. Furthermore, in 2010, a government report found that there had been no positive changes to Pyongyang’s behaviour despite a decade of mass aid and encouragement.

Although many of the approaches to North Korea have reflected in either humanitarian aid and developmental aid as in the Sunshine policies, or the harsh sanctions that were emplaced by the United Nations Security Council and the United States; these policies have looked at the North Korean nation as a lone rogue state, being a leftover from the Cold War. These policies primarily target the North Korean institution and military as a direct adversary, and thus by isolating or incentivizing such authorities they could minimize aggression between the two nations. However by utilizing such tactics, they often isolate the North Korean institution, forcing them into a corner and forcing their hand in reacting with equally aggressive actions. As South Korea retains an economic advantage over the North, the North Korean government, being stuck and isolated in its corner, is forced to utilize their military, their main strength, to institute a constant game of brinkmanship as no other channel of dialogue or medium can be consistently used by their state in talking to their wary neighbors.

As a result, a change in solutions is needed, especially in upgrading North Korea’s ability to talk to other nations. Pacifying North-South Korean relations would need to end North Korea’s constant brinkmanship by offering greater integration of the North Korean nation into the regional environment, especially in the realm of diplomatic dialogue. One of the key steps would be to re-establish diplomatic relations with the North. Although the North-South axis that is present on the Korean Peninsula presents itself as quite a geopolitical obstacle, such differences between the two nations and their principal allies needs to be normalized in order to develop better relations across the Korean DMZ. As the North-South dynamic as polar opposites is in itself a relic of the Cold War when such polarization occurred at a global scale, such a dynamic needs to be re-updated with the modern geopolitical situation. Instead of focusing on the direct confrontation between the two nations, greater inter-state dialogue based on re-growing good faith is needed between all involved parties, such as Russia, Japan, and the United States. Treating the situation as part of the regional acquisition for peace and prosperity is highly needed and would in turn force North Korea onto a regional stage whereby it can equally and diplomatically develop discussion and renew good-faith with its neighbors.

One such example would be the need for South Korea’s greater dialogue with China. Due to the randomness and unpredictability of the North Korea nation, one method would be too by-pass the North Korean state and relate to its principal backer, China. As North Korea economy is backed by Chinese support, it is largely limited to a degree by the arrangements between the nation and its biggest backer. This relationship between the nations was summarized by Alexandre Dor from The Diplomat with the Chinese aphorism, “When the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold” (唇亡齿寒), stating that the North Korean state exists as a buffer zone rather than “not out of a fraternalistic love for a fellow communist nation”. As China exists as a great player in the international community and economy, especially in its ties to the burgeoning South Korean economy, asking for its help in achieving its constant call for “calm and restraint” would be highly influential in ending North Korea’s game of brinkmanship. Therefore, greater understanding between South Korea and China would be highly favourable in achieving greater long term stability on the Korean Peninsula; and perhaps lead to further direct dialogue between the South Korean and North Korean governments.

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