A wish from Tehran

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in 2006 that a “modern, strong, and peaceful” Iran could play a significant role in contributing to regional stability and peace. He argued that Iran’s future depends on whether its leaders embraced the country as a revolutionary cause or a traditional nation-state. As one of the world’s few theocratic governments, the Islamic Republic of Iran uniquely intersects religious and political authority, with leadership seen as God’s representatives on Earth. This distinctive structure has drawn interest from observers eager to comprehend how Iran’s political composition influences its actions on the global stage. Founded during the political upheavals of the late 1970s, Iran initially approached its foreign policy with ideological fervor, driven by a desire to spread revolutionary Islamism throughout the Persian Gulf. Over time, however, Iran’s foreign policy has shifted towards realism and pragmatism, but despite these changes, Iran’s motivations remain rooted in a deep-seated innate desire to counter foreign influence in the region, especially that of the United States. Today, the country mainly focuses on advancing its national interests and elevating regime security. Through a blend of diplomacy and strategic alliances with regional non-state actors, Iran seeks to expand its influence and deter any forces that might threaten its regional aspirations.

The 1979 Islamic Revolution transformed Iranian politics and the country’s position in the Middle East as Ayatollah Khomeini and his allies overthrew the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Backed by the United States and ruled over Iran, the Shah’s policy of modernization and secularization alienated many conservative religious and nationalist groups and was viewed by Iranians as a symbol of Western imperialism on Iranian soil. The Revolution was unreservedly a decisive rejection of decades of foreign intervention in Iranian affairs and provided a sense of national sovereignty to the Iranian people. Since then, the new Islamic Republic, under Khomeini, sought to create a sphere of influence in the Middle East devoid of the elements Iranians had lived under for the past few decades.

One of the core principles of early Iranian foreign policy was its aspiration to export the ideals of the Islamic Revolution, particularly to Sunni Muslim-majority nations in the Middle East. This ambition was deeply influenced by Ayatollah Khomeini’s belief that his religious authority, which had just succeeded in expelling foreign influence from Iran, represented the only legitimate form of governance. He viewed monarchies as incompatible with Islamic principles, condemning them as unjust and corrupt. As a result, the newly established Islamic Republic immediately found itself at odds with many of the region’s monarchies. Khomeini notably exclaimed that Iran’s revolution will not stop until “the cry ‘there is no God but Allah’ resounds over the whole world,” wishing to see his form of government to usher heaven on Earth. 

The first significant test of Iran’s foreign policy came during the Iran-Iraq War, which began a year after the Islamic Revolution. Saddam Hussein’s invasion constituted a formidable challenge to the newly established and diplomatically isolated Iranian regime. The United States, along with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan, provided Iraq with both military and diplomatic support, bolstering Hussein’s efforts to overthrow Iran’s nascent government. Iraq, with substantial backing, sought to dismantle the regime in Tehran, which had previously attempted to destabilize Iraq’s ruling Ba’athist government. Khomeini portrayed the war in dichotomy – a struggle between national sovereignty and foreign aggression. He argued that Iraq’s aim was not only to weaken Iran but also to assist the United States and its allies in neutralizing a perceived threat to the Western-dominated order in the Middle East. The Iranian leadership saw the conflict as a continuation of the country’s long-standing fight for independence from foreign influence, a narrative that soon resonated with the Iranian people. This framing, which appealed to both nationalism, ignited the popular desire to protect Iran’s sovereignty and helped to unify the population in support of the war. In this context, the concept of martyrdom took on profound significance. Khomeini urged the public to defend Iran against external threats, asserting that global superpowers had sown the seeds of internal division within the country. Through this rhetoric, Khomeini appealed to the nationalist sentiments of Iranians, convincing them that the war was not merely revolutionary—it was a battle for the nation’s very destiny and survival to repudiate foreign power on Iranian soil.

The Iran-Iraq War had a profound and lasting impact on the Islamic Republic, reshaping both its defense strategies and foreign policy. The leadership in Tehran realized the unsustainability of ideological isolation, particularly when confronted by a united coalition of anti-Iranian forces supported by regional and global powers close to its border. Besides the devastation it brought to Iranian life and society, the war also deepened Iran’s mistrust of international institutions, especially the United Nations, which initially failed to identify Iraq as the aggressor. Iran perceived that influential UN members, notably the United States and its allies, favored Iraq and sought to use their geopolitical influence to isolate Iran on the global stage. Iran’s disillusionment with the UN further intensified when the organization did not condemn Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers and civilians. Tehran viewed this as a glaring hypocrisy by an organization that was aimed to reduce global conflict and promote peace, believing that even when international norms and laws were violated, no one would come to Iran’s aid. This experience reinforced Iran’s conviction that it must rely solely on itself for national defense and cannot depend on external powers for its security.

The War also exposed the limitation of the Iranian conventional military, which had initially struggled against the better-equipped Iraqis in battles. As such, Iran began to pursue a strategy of asymmetrical warfare as a key element of its defensive posture. The use of asymmetrical warfare, in Iran’s usage of irregular tactics and the employment of non-state actors in the Middle East who will defend Iranian interests without pulling Tehran into conventional warfare allowed Iran to compensate for its military shortfall by focusing on attrition. Iran’s development of “Forward Defense,” which utilizes groups such as Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen to exert power far beyond its borders and create a buffer zone between home and neighboring countries, especially away from Israel. This “Axis of Resistance” is formed particularly as it dedicates itself to countering the influence of the United States in the region, posing a significant cost for Washington to support leaders in Jerusalem, and act as a constant threat to the state of Israel. However, although Iran behaves as a leader and a notable supporter of these regional militias, it does not translate into outright control. Iran’s lack of total control can actually be beneficial as it gives Tehran plausible deniability.

The Israel-Palestine war exemplifies the dynamic between Iran and its regional proxies. Although Iran had prior knowledge that the attack by Hamas on October 7th, 2023 against Israel would occur, it did not immediately participate in the conflict. Iran, however, along with Hezbollah, welcomed the attack in principle, convinced by Hamas that the domestic situation in Israel – the unpopular judicial reform in Israel initiated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – served as the perfect distraction. Arguing that it needed time to “prepare the environment,” Iran had initially denied that it had participated or had prior knowledge of the incoming, as Supreme Leader Khamenei said that Iran would “kiss the hand of those who planned the attack on the Zionist regime,” but vehemently denied Iranian participation. Hamas’s action triggering the conflict also demonstrates that Iran does not have total control over its proxies, and that it cannot exercise its wishes or goals down to a partner’s minute detail. This allows Iran to deny its involvement, or knowledge of its partners’ actions, claiming that Iran is not responsible for the conflict. Moreover, Iran’s regional proxies also help Tehran create strategic depth. By having partners embedded in conflicts and countries across the Middle East, Iran can make the potential of an Israeli or American attack on Iranian soil much more costly, as such a situation would not only isolate Iran but contrarily provoke more regional proxies to join the fight. In this sense, Iran’s allies serve as a buffer zone against Israel and the United States, yet allow Tehran to have a geographical reach, allowing it to intervene and respond to threats across the region.

The strategic deterrence of Iran’s axis of resistance present in the Middle East further allows Tehran to ensure its regime security from outside threats. Viewing itself as vulnerable compared to countries much more powerful, Iran can counter and project its power onto the global stage and ensure its participation as a powerful regional country. This demonstration of influence further maintains Iran’s ability to communicate and provide weapons to its non-state proxies, challenging foreign interests and promoting the structure and integrity of its alliance. Iran’s goal of achieving independent self-defense is accomplished by having a decentralized alliance structure where Iran’s allies are at every corner of the Middle East, where the potential cost of the conflict is high and its opportunity cost – maintaining the status quo of negative peace – is low. The power of this alliance increases as countries refuse to challenge these non-state actors, which leads to exacerbating their own security dilemma. At its basic level, Iranian foreign policy post-Iran-Iraq war saw a transition into a more pragmatic, realistic understanding of its threat perception. Viewing the Middle East as a battleground, figuratively and literally at the same time, between national interest and foreign influences. Thus, establishing an alliance of proxies who will fight Iran’s fight minimizes Iran’s chances of being attacked and maximizes its regime security.

Fundamentally, although Iran’s foreign policy has been altered over time, initially driven by ideology and revolutionaries, later into a pragmatic view of regional affairs, the underlying element that dominates Iranian foreign conduct has been the rejection of outside influences in the Middle East. As such, Iran maximizes its power through organizations such as the “axis of resistance” to deter attacks that may wreak havoc on its soil, a lesson Tehran has learned from its seven-year conflict with Iraq. The promotion of Iranian interest and the projection of power through this alliance further guarantees the livelihood of the regime, which allows it to continue to exercise its power in the Middle East as a formidable player.

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